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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to compare levels of issue 
conflict between political party followers in a current setting 
with data on issue conflict compiled in a 1958 national survey.
The data presented by Herbert McCloskey, Paul J. Hoffman and 
Rosemary O'Hara in their article, "Issue Conflict and Consensus 
Among Party Leaders and Followers/* prompted their conclusion that 
Democratic and Republican party identifiers differed only slightly 
in their views on twenty-four national issues. It is suggested 
that since the McCloskey-Hoffman-O'Hara survey in 1958, changes 
may have occurred in the amount of issue divergence between groups 
of rank and file Democrats and Republicans.
The following hypothesis is investigated: ”A re-examination 
of levels of issue conflict between Democratic and Republican fol­
lowers will reveal significantly higher levels of divergence than 
were discovered in earlier research by McCloskey, Hoffman and 
O'Hara.*’
A questionnaire including the twenty-four issues was admin­
istered to 100 randomly selected voters in Harrisonburg, Virginia, 
during spring, 1973. Results of the survey confirmed the hypothesis 
and demonstrated markedly higher levels Qf issue conflict than had 
been demonstrated in the 1958 study.
It is suggested that data from the Harrisonburg survey and 
similar findings in other recent studies cast doubt on the theory 
that the American electorate is characterized by a lack of conflict 
over national issues. Further, it is suggested that the recent data 
challenge the assumption that American political parties must blur 
their differences and converge to centrist positions on policy 
matters to attract maximum electoral support.
ISSUE CONFLICT AMONG PARTY FOLLOWERS i 
A RE-EXAMINATION
CHAPTER I
ISSUES AND VOTING: AN OVERVIEW
During the 1968 Presidential campaign, when Governor George C. 
Wallace of Alabama ran as the nominee and leader of a newly formed 
third party movement, the American electorate was treated to the 
most widely voiced denunciation of the traditional two-party system 
in twenty years.
Not since the Dixiecrat days of Henry Wallace's 1948 campaign 
had the two major parties been so maligned for their alleged 
"me-too ism/1
Gov. Wallace revived campaign history with his acidic description 
of the Democrats and Republicans as "Tweedledee and Tweedledum," or 
as the governor preferred to phrase it, "Tweedledumb and Tweedle- 
dumber." He inspired the cheers and votes of millions of Americans 
with his frequently aired charge that "hot a dime's worth of dif­
ference" separated the two dominant parties.
Wallace's criticism drew support from unexpected quarters when 
then-Sen. Eugene McCarthy also denounced the lack of clear policy 
distinctions between the Democrats, who had spurned McCarthy's own 
candidacy, and the Republicans.
The issue was not unique to the 1968 campaign.
Four years earlier, in his own Presidential bid, Republican
Senator Barry M. Goldwater of Arizona had appealed to support from 
those voters who sought, in Goldwater*s words, "a choice not an echo," 
His point, of course, was that the 1964 election offered the elec­
torate a rare opportunity to select from two men who differed 
substantially on many major policy issues and reflected sharply 
divergent political philosophies, Goldwater told convention delegates 
his opponents for the G.O,P, nominations, principally then-Gov,
Nelson Rockefeller of New York aid then-Gov. William Scranton of 
Pennsylvania, represented only mild departures from the philosophy of 
Lyndon Johnson at a time when the country needed a clear alternative.
The notion that Democrats and Republicans play an election 
game of "me-toolsE/* did not originate with Wallace, McCarthy or Gold­
water. But their criticisms provide a timely perspective for a 
discussion of issue conflict between the two parties.
The discussion which follows will review comments and arguments 
by several researchers and analysts on the role of issues in American 
voting behavior. Particular emphasis will be focused upon issue 
conflict between voters who identify with the Republican party and 
those who consider themselves closer to the Democratic party.
A subsequent chapter will report results of a survey of issue 
conflict conducted by the author in 1973.
Philip E. Converse, Warren E, Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk and 
Arthur C. Wolfe, in an analysis of the 1968 election, noted:
In every United States election there are accusations from one 
quarter or another that the two conventional parties provide no 
more than " tweedledee" and "tweedledurf* candidates* However, 
these accusations as aired in the public media rose to something 
of a crescendo in 1968 • • • and even as measured a source as the 
New York Times noted wryly that it would take no more than the 
deletion of two or three codicils to leave the official 1968 
campaign platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties as 
utterly indistinguishable documents.^
Although McCarthy was dissuaded from a fourth-party candidacy 
in 1968 and neither Wallace nor Goldwater came close to polling a 
majority of the popular votes in their Presidential attempts, the 
enthusiasm of their supporters was evidence of the dissatisfaction 
many voters seemed to feel with the major parties. The alternatives 
typically offered by the parties in political campaigns are too 
similar, some voters seemed to be saying. It was a dissatisfaction 
which transcended McCarthy*s liberalism, Goldwater's conservatism and 
Wallace's populism.
Goldwater* s own race and, more recently the McGovern-Nixon 
clash of 1972 are ample evidence that clear alternatives sometimes do 
emerge from the parties' nominating processes. But in the critics* 
eyes, such ideological conflicts.are rare exceptions.
The observation that conflict is rare predates the 1960s.
As far back as the Victorian era, Britain*s Lord Bryce noted 
in his comments on American politics that the two major U.S. parties 
were "mirror images of each o t h e r O t h e r  analysts have concluded 
that "in ideology and policy^positions the major American parties 
are indistinguishable, and compared with other party systems they
3
show a monumental disinterest in matters of issue and ideology."
Such comments defy quick, simple refutation. Perhaps, however, 
the voters* perceptions of the broad similarities in the two parties 
can be explained through a brief review of the role of political par­
ties in a political system.
Two general functions can be seen as party goals: (1) to win
elections, and (2) to articulate ideological or policy positions.
Frank Sorauf, in Political Parties in the American System, argued 
that these two goals actually are incompatible, particularly in a 
two-party political system.
For a party to achieve electoral success, said Sorauf, it must 
mobilize the support of a large portion of the electorate and conse­
quently must appeal to diverse groups of voters within the society.
Yet, to articulate a clear position on ideology or specific 
issues is, inevitably, to alienate that portion of the electorate 
which disagrees. The contradiction seems inherent. Electoral success 
depends on mass appeal; ideological or policy stands imply limitations 
of that appeal.
As Sorauf explained, n . it is an inescapable fact that 
within two- and three-party systems, political parties find it dif- 
icult to be both ideological parties and successful, electoral, brok- 
erage parties • • the necessity of winning elections stands as the
greatest barrier to ideology in the political party.***.
In the multi-party political systems of Western European states, 
the conflict between issue articulation and voter appeal is of less 
concern because election success is tied to proportionate voting.
Ideological faith to an issue-motivated constituency is thus less 
troublesome* But, as Sorauf suggested, the incompatibility of the
two party goals increases in party systems where fewer parties are 
active*
For the fewer the competitors, the more inclusive the electoral 
party must be* This then is the major dimension of the dilemma: 
the fewer the competitive parties in the party system, the greater 
will be the likelihood that any one party's success in performing 
either of these two great party functions will be inversely 
related to its success in the other*
But whereas in the multi-party system several minor parties 
may join together in a coalition government, in the two-party system 
the individual party itself must form the coalition* The result in 
American pluralist society is a two-party system in which both 
parties seek to play a "brokerage?' or "umbrella?* role, drawing under 
their broad banners a diversified coalition— a cross section— of the 
electorate* Because power is available only with 50-plus per cent 
of the voters' support, each party seeks to spread its "umbrella" 
widely enough to include all comers.
Apparently, the parties decide that, of the two goals defined by 
Sorauf, electoral success is more crucial than issue articulation, 
because without electoral success, the party ceases to have a platform 
from which to articulate any policy positions at all.
To achieve electoral success in a two-party system, the appeal 
of the parties inevitably must overlap, at least to the one voter who 
will provide a margin of victory. And in a pluralist society where 
class differences are not clearly perceived by most voters and
where few voters see themselves as ideologically-motivated, the 
overlap of the parties* appeal may widen to the point that the 
parties seek support from basically the same constituencies.
Socio-economic class identification does not clearly div­
ide American voters into distinct groups. Robert E. Lane and 
David 0. Sears concluded in Public Opinion that many voters are 
hesitant even to label themselves as members of any class.
"Even among adults • • there is often a reluctance to
make class self-identifications. As many as a third of a nation­
wide sample were unable or unwilling to identify themselves as 
members of any social class," Lane and Sears wrote. *
Neither are most American voters* political perceptions 
triggered by ideological positions which they recognize. When 
Angus Campbell, Warren E. Miller, Philip E. Converse and Donald 
E. Stokes compiled the data for their ground-breaking study of 
The American Voter, which was based on studies of the 1952 and 
1956 election campaigns, they discovered only 2.5 per cent of the 
nationwide sample in 1956 that could be classified as ideologues, 
and only another 9 per cent of the sample that fit the authors* 
definition of "near ideologues." These figures translated to 
3.5 per cent and 15 per cent of all voters, the authors said.
They concluded that most voters were not motivated by ideological 
considerations in their political perceptions.^
Neither does any one issue divide the American electorate 
and thus make feasible diverging appeals by the two parties. T~
spite of the heterogenous nature of the U.S. society, said Sorauf, 
the parties are unable to identify "some axis, some line of separ-
O
ation, on which to divide the American electorate.”
In the absence of a clear division by class, ideological or
issue grounds, the American parties apparently look in unison to the
center ground for support sufficient to provide electoral success.
It is not surprising that Richard M. Scammon and Ben J.
Wattenberg, in their 1970 study of The Real Maioritv. offered
identical advice to Democratic and Republican strategists: "Go to
the center." The Republican strategy should be "a mirror image”
of the Democrats®, the authors suggested. Neither party should
allow itself to be caught holding a minority position on a salient
issue, Scammon and Wattenberg urged. Party strategists were warned
9
to "play within the 35-yard lines.”
"It is the judgment of the authors that there are no two 
strategies for victory--they are the same strategy with different 
rhetoric. This single strategy involves a drive toward the center 
of the electorate,*' they wrote.
•Quite explicitly, then,” observed Washington Post columnist 
David Broder, "Scammon and Wattenberg®s advice is that each party 
should ape the other, so far as possible.”
Scammon and Wattenberg*s "pragmatic?* prescription is based on 
the theory of necessary convergence--that the nature of the American 
party system dictates a blurring of the differences between the 
two parties, a muting of distinctions which usually leads to
near identical appeals by the two parties and to the very "me-tooisnf* 
which Wallace, McCarthy and Goldwater decried*
Scammon and Wattenberg described the theory as follows:
• • • the drive toward the attitudinal center is crucial in 
politics because it produces the maximum number of votes, and, 
as is well known, the man with the most votes wins* * • • In a 
most simplistic way for the moment: on a scale of 100, a 
candidate taking a position of 25 on an attitudinal question 
gives his opponent all the votes from 26 to 100* On the other 
hand, a candidate taking a position of 49 or 50 or even 51 
begins to cut into his opponent's vote*• • • This may sound 
cynical; it is not* The jousting for the center in politics 
is only a craven way of expressing a far nobler sentiment: 
Politicians in a democratic form of government are in business 
to represent the will of the majority of the people. • • • A 
politician must either go where the ducks are or convince the 
ducks he is where they want to be* 3ut the final choice is the 
choice of the ducks, not of the politician*12
Broder put it more succinctly: "Party politics is almost by
definition accommodation politics*"
The effect of necessary convergence, Sorauf said, is that
American political parties become neutral brokers seeking votes*
In an electorate that divides in an almost infinite number of 
issue permutations and entertains an equally large number of 
potentially conflicting interests, the competitive party must 
rely on non-ideological appeals— the attractive candidate, for 
instance— or on pseudo-ideological symbols, platitudes, or truisms 
to hold its disparate electorate together* The American parties 
become great neuStral electoral brokers, whose art and skill is 
the minimization of difference and division*• • • Their role in 
a competitive two-party system demands an emphasis on consensus 
and agreement, on the widely held political pieties rather than 
the issues that divide men, * * * The capsule slogan and the 
flashing smile capture far more political attention in the 
electorate than the windy manifesto or the sober discussion 
of political philosophy* ^
Herbert Agar addressed the same phenomenon in slightly less 
cynical terms* He noted that the process of coalition-building 
forces political parties and systems to blend the specific concerns 
of small groups within the party into a total platform which
promises something for everyone. It becomes necessary, said Agar,
to:
• * * water down the selfish demands of regions, races, classes, 
business associations, into a national policy which will alien­
ate no major group and which will contain at least a small
plum for everybody. This is the price of unity in a continent
wide federation*
The scenario which emerges from these authors' comments is of
political parties which mold a winning coalition from the clay of
docile voters* As voters do not respond in mass to cues based on
appeals to class, ideology or issue, the argument goes, political
parties rely on broad platitudes and patriotic cues, and blur their
differences to avoid alienating any segment of the electorate more
than the opposition does*
The question that arises from this cynical view is: "Does a
common thread unite the members of an American political party and
distinguish them from members of the opposition party -- perhaps some
subtle and generally overlooked similarity among the party adherents
which ties them together?"
During the 1950s, when political scientists first began to pay
serious attention to empirical analyses of voters' opinions, several
researchers studies matters which impinge on this question*
In their study of The American Voter* Campbell and his colleagues
analyzed three motivations in the individual's voting decision: 
issue orientation, candidate appeal and party identification* 
Through their analysis of data from 1952 and 1956, the authors 
concluded that, of the three motivating factors, party identifica­
tion has the strongest impact on a voter's decision about how to 
vote. Candidate appeal was determined to be only a secondary 
influence, while issue orientation had the slightest impact of the 
three factors.
Issue position thus seemed an unlikely common thread among 
party adherents. A study published in 1960 seemed to provide even 
further evidence that issues played a minor, if any role in attract­
ing members to a political party in the United States.
In that study, which was published in the June 1960 edition of 
the American Political Science Review* Herbert McCloskey, Paul J, 
Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara presented their conclusions based on a 
survey of "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and 
Followers." The paper's findings were drawn from a survey of dele­
gates and alternates to the 1956 Democratic and Republican national 
conventions and from a nationwide sample of voters*
The researchers examined levels of agreement and disagreement 
among leaders and followers of each party to determine what 
cohesiveness of issue orientation existed. Their conclusions were 
to have a significant impact on political scientists through the 
1960s and into the 1970s.
McCloskey and his colleagues began with the assumption that such
cohesiveness among party followers— rank and file voters who identify
with a particular party— would be minimal. In view of the discussion
above, their arguments sound familiar:
Since both parties want to attract support from the centrist 
and moderate segments of the electorate, their views on basic 
issues will, it is thought, tend to converge. Like giant 
business enterprises competing for the same market, they will 
be led to offer commodities that are in many respects identical 
• • • It is one thing for a small party in a multi-party system 
to preserve its ideological purity, quite another for a mass 
party in a two-party system to do so. The one has little hope 
of becoming a majority, and can most easily survive by remaining 
identified with the narrow audience from which it draws its 
chief supporters; the other can succeed only by accommodating 
the conflicting claims of many diverse groups— only, in short, by 
blunting ideological distinctions.17
Further, the authors wrote, political, cultural, historical
and sociological factors combine to limit the role of ideology and
issues in the American party system:
The development and enforcement of a sharply delineated ideology 
is also hindered by the absence in either party of a firmly 
established, authoritative, and continuing organizational center 
empowered to decide those questions of doctrine and discipline. 
Party affiliation is loosely defined, responsibility is weak or 
non-existent, and organs for indoctrinating or communicating 
with party members are at best rudimentary. Cultural and his­
torical differences may also contribute to the weaker ideological 
emphasis of American as opposed to European parties. Many of the 
great historical cleavages that have divided European nations 
for centuries . . .  have never taken root in this country* • • »
In addition, never having known a titled nobility, we have 
largely been freed from the conflicts found elsewhere between 
the classes . . .  Consider, too, the progress made in the 
United Sates toward neutralizing forces which ordinarily lead 
to sharp social and hence intellectual and political differ­
entiation. The class and status structure of American society has 
attained a rate of mobility equalling or exceeding that of any 
other established society . . .  Rural-urban differences continue 
to exist, of course, but they too have been diminishing . . .  In
short, a great many Americans have been subjected in their public 
lives to identical stimuli— a condition unlikely to generate 
strong, competing ideologies.10
Their research, the authors said, was intended to test the 
accuracy of those observations. The precise manner of their investigation 
and a detailed discussion of findings is contained in Chapter II of 
this paper. For now, it is sufficient to summarize.
McCloskey and his co-workers concluded that the leadership 
factions of the two parties "are distinct communities of co-believers 
who diverge sharply on many important issues." Rank and file party 
members, however, were found to differ only negligibly on the same 
issues that divided the leadership cadres.
The authors concluded that no support was demonstrated for the
hypothesis that party leaders ignore deep cleavages within the
electorate, and that parties converge to the center despite voters*
more disparate opinions. In fact, said the researchers, "one might
indeed more accurately assert the contrary, to wit* that the natural
19cleavages between the leaders are largely ignored by voters."
This conclusion was supported by Campbell ££ al. in their study 
of The American Voter. They noted that few in the survey sample 
showed knowledge of issues and still fewer knew about the issues and 
simultaneously perceived a difference in the ways the parties approached 
the issues. For many voters, the absence of perceived differences was 
due to a simple lack of information, the authors said.
Party convergence on issue positions also plays a role in limiting 
the voters* perceptions of party positions, however, they observed.
What underlies this failure to perceive party differences on 
policies of concern to the individual? Its roots are to be 
found in circumstances of the external world as well as in 
limitations of the individual* Where distinctions between the 
parties are academic, it would be surprising if only a few 
people did succeed in discrimination, however intense popular 
feelings on the issue might be* Nor can we always assume that 
people failing to perceive differences are less well informed 
than those who do, although this may be the general rule; they 
may simply be more "up to date?* in their images of parties 
whose policies are indeed converging.^®
Further support for the notion that issues play only a small 
role in voters* partisan choices can be found in Gerald M. Pomper*s 
Elections in America, Control and Influence in Democratic Politics.
Voters are not themselves ideological persons and therefore 
fail to perceive even minor ideological differences between the Demo­
cratic and Republican parties, Pomper said. Neither does party 
loyalty necessarily follow subconscious ideological lines— conserv­
atives and liberals populate both of the major parties.
"Policy questions, then, are not central considerations for 
many voters," according to Pomper. "Policy considerations, therefore, 
cannot be said generally to determine campaign outcomes. . . .  The 
policy-oriented philosophical citizen does not appear often in 
voting studies."^
It is interesting to note that although Pomper*s book was 
published in 1970, his chief references for the discussion of issues 
are The American Voter and "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party 
Leaders and Followers," both of which were based on surveys conducted 
no later than 1958. This is evidence of the lasting impact of these 
two seminal studies on political scientists over the last 15 years.
Both studies have been highly respected within the discipline and 
have shaped the opinions of many instructors and students in 
political science classes. Relatively little work has been done 
until recently either to challenge or support their findings.
Pomper agreed with Campbell jet al. that party identification
and candidate image play a stronger role in voting decisions than
does an individual's issue orientation.
Traditional partisanship and candidate personalities account for 
much of the balloting. While many voters are concerned with 
their particular interests, few are aware of or interested in 
the entire range of policies or in general ideological 
postures . . .  Furthermore, voters are more conscious of past 
than future policies. They make retrospective judgments on 
the record of the incumbent 
between alternate programs.
With the role of issue orientation relegated to third place 
in the heirarchy of motivating factors in voting, political 
analysts of the late 1950s and the 1960s concentrated on the role of 
party identification, or partisanship in voting.
William H. Flanigan, in Political Behavior in the American 
Electorate, called partisanship "the most important single influence 
on political opinions and voting behavior." The concept may be 
defined, he wrote, as: "the feeling of sympathy for, and loyalty to, 
a political party which an individual acquires (probably) during 
childhood and which endures (usually) with increasing intensity 
throughout his life."^
Early development of partisan loyalty was documented by David 
Easton and Robert D. Hess in their paper, "The Child's Political
farty, not prospective choices
World," in 1962. Most American children develop such loyalties
at about the second grade level, they asserted.
Most children do not become familiar with the term political 
party until the fourth and fifth grade at the earliest.
But before this, as early as the. second grade, large numbers 
are nevertheless able to assert a party identification . . .  
Interviews . . .  indicate that in the early grades— the point 
at which party preference becomes well established— the 
children may be adopting party identification in much the same 
way that they appropriate the family's religious beliefs, 
family name, neighborhood location or other basic charac­
teristics of life. Nor do most children display partisan 
feelings in a purely formal way. They seem to be aware of 
the implications of party preferences as an expression of 
explicit commitment to a point of view, however superficial 
their understanding of this point of view may be • . • 
but they did feel the pressure to adopt a partisan posture, 
however apolitical its meaning was for them.^
Fred I. Greenstein, author of The American Party System and
The American People, stated that a voter's feeling of party loyalty
usually does not result from a conscious decision to support one
set of ideals as opposed to another. Rather, Greenstein said,
partisanship comes about inadvertently as a result of social stimuli.
The development occurs before the child is capable of dealing with
abstract thoughts, according to Greenstein.
In the United States an individual's identification is usually 
an evolutionary outcome of the largely inadvertent and unin­
tended political learning that is absorbed from family, peer 
group, neighborhood, schools, and mass media, remarkably early 
in childhood. By the age of ten (fifth grade), more than 
one-half of all American children consider themselves little 
Republicans or Democrats, whereas at this age the capacities 
for abstraction that are necessary for issue orientation are 
largely undeveloped, and orientations toward candidates and 
political leaders are immature in the sense that children tend 
to be idealistically uncritical of those individuals in public 
life of whom they are aware . . .  For the young child, party 
identification is so barren of supporting information that he
may be able to say, "I am a Republican" or "I am a Democrat^ 
without even knowing the party of the incumbent President.
Kenneth P. Langton elaborates on the procedure by which a child
learns "correct" political orientation:
Behavior which is rewarded is reinforced, that which is not is 
dropped. Often incidental cues will lead to "correct*' imitative 
behavior. A child seeking parental attention may hear his father 
announcing proudly that he is a Republican, his father and 
father's father were Republicans, and any honest and decent man 
could not be anything but a Republican— an obvious cue. The 
child responds by announcing that he is a Republican, and is 
rewarded by receiving attention • • . However at this stage in 
the socialization process, the child's imitation of parental 
party preferences probably occurs without regard to the complexity 
of values and beliefs that may be related to the parent's party 
preference.
For those who adopt the view of American electoral choices as 
the corporate decisions of an informed, philosophical and intelligent 
citizenry, these findings may be unsettling. If party identification 
is the dominant motivating factor in an individual's voting decision, 
and if such identification is the product not of thoughtful consider-, 
ation but of puppet-like reaction of a child to stimuli which he 
cannot even comprehend, purists* views of the democratic process are 
put on shaky ground at best.
The disturbing implications of these findings are heightened by 
further data and conclusions about the role of party identification.
The hope that party loyalties which develop initially among young 
children are later redefined by more mature young adults, is apparently 
illusory, according to researchers.
Greenstein noted that party identification which "might appear
to be one of the simpler and more fragile phenomena proves to
27be durable and most influential."
Voting behavior studies indicate that a sizeable majority of 
Americans not only form their party allegiances at an early, impres­
sionable age, but also stick with that early identification through­
out their political lives.
"It is apparent," Campbell and his colleagues said, * that
identification with political parties, once established, is an
28
attachment which is not easily changed."
Pomper argued that the stability of party loyalty is overstated
in some reports, including The American Voter. But he conceded that
most voters adopt the partisan identification of their parents, and
29
only about 20 per cent change during their lives. He also reaffirmed
the fidelity with which most children treat the party identification
they assumed so early.
Party identification is quite firm. It develops early in life, 
before there is any detailed understanding of public issues and 
governmental institutions. By the fourth grade, a majority of 
schoolchildren identify with a political party. For the most 
part, children assume and later retain the same party loyalty 
as their fathers and mothers . . .  Even among adults, nearly 
80 per cent hold to the same faction as their parents. Once 
established, this loyalty is highly resistant to change . . .
Even when an individual’s perception of an issue does not 
coincide with his perception of his party’s position, partisanship 
may not be threatened, according to Pomper. White Southerners, for 
example, may oppose integration, but nevertheless continue to 
support the Democratic party, regardless oft the national party’s
general pro-integration image, he said.
Perhaps the most damaging blow to adherents of the purist
view of American democracy--those who hope to find intelligent, informed
citizens in the balloting booth— is the contention of many scholars
that a voter*s issue orientation is the product of, rather than the
impetus for, his party loyalty.
Reports of voting behavior studies of the last 15 years seem
unanimous in their conclusion that a voter*s party loyalty has the
capacity to shape his attitudes and his perceptions of right and
wrong on political issues.
As Campbell and his associates noted, "Once a person has
acquired some embryonic party attachment, it is easy for him to
discover that most events in the ambiguous world of politics redound
,.32to the credit of his chosen party.'*
Or, as Pomper noted, "Loyalty to the Democrats or Republicans
will affect the perceptions and actions of the voter to a considerable
degree • • Because of party loyalty, most voters do not wait for
33a campaign to begin before deciding for whom to vote.** Flanigan
observed that '* . • partisan identification provides guidance for
the public on policy matters; that is, most Americans hold their
opinions by following what they perceive to be the view consistent
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with their partisanship."
In the eyes of these scholars, then, party identification is 
not a result of issue positions that the voter holds, but rather is
stimulus for the formation of issue positions that will allow him to
remain in conformity with his psychological commitment to the party#
Party loyalty is thus not merely an expression of voters* opinions,
but an agent of opinion-formation#
"In the competition of voices reaching the individual, the political
party is an opinion-forming agency of great importanceconcluded
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Campbell and his colleagues#
This opinion-formation role which in some other societies is
performed by class identification, falls by default to the political
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parties in America due to the absence of salient class identity#
The effect of partisanship, said Campbell et al., is "profound.'*
Apparently party has a profound influence across the full range 
of political objects to which the individual voter responds# The 
strength of relationship between party identification and the 
dimensions of partisan attitude suggests that responses to each 
element of national politics are deeply affected by the individual*s 
enduring party attachments#
The individual’s party identification, therv stems from a set of
psychological and social cues he receives at an early age, and endures
through his life, molding his reactions to issues through further
psychological and social cues articulated in campaign rhetoric# Ir.
a two-party system in which both parties converge at the center of
issue positions, it is doubtful that the voter will receive cues from
his party to alienate him from its ranks and send him to the opposing
faction# Both parties will articulate a similar set of cues, so the
voter will note no conflict on which to base a decision for changing
parties#
"So long-as the party he supports continues to be identified
with those programs, leaders and groups to which he is attached,**
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said Pomper, **he will retain his loyalty."
With this understanding of the role of party identification in 
mind, a contradiction seems to arise concerning the role of issues 
in electoral decision-making and the theory of necessary convergence 
of American political parties. On the one hand, political analysts 
say, parties are forced to converge on centrist positions and to blur 
their differences to avoid alienating voters. At the same time, they 
stress that voters congregate in the center of the spectrum largely 
because the parties* cues drive them there. Can both be true?
The central question arising is, "Do centrist parties produce 
a centrist electorate, or does the centrist electorate force parties 
to assume centrist positions?**
With the background of scholarly argument in the preceding 
discussion, it becomes possible to explore a few theoretical notions 
of voting behavior and the American party system.
A first notion concerns the extent of centrism evidenced in the 
behavior of the Democratic and Republican parties. The adherent of 
that purist notion that some voters are not mere puppets on a string 
of sociological cues might argue that the parties do not, in fact, 
converge to an exact sameness but rather reflect overlapping but 
distinct coalitions. The overlap may be extensive, but not total.
Sorauf argued that even parties seeking mass appeal in a two-party 
system begin with a distinct nuclei.
Even the Large brokerage party, in seeking electoral aggregates 
by minimizing differences, builds its coalitions around a nucleus 
that distinguishes its electorate from that of its competitor.
The commitment of the major American parties to a constellation 
of interests may, in fact, be stronger than we give it credit 
for. Many of the voter loyalties within the American electorate 
that appear to be traditional, old-line party loyalties, are in 
reality loyalties to this silent, implicit ideology of interest.
The man who votes for the Republican party because his family 
always has, or because his friends do, may be voting for a 
distant, traditional, unspoken ideology or interest that has 
been transmitted to him as he first learns about the political 
world. Voting for the party of one's father may be, considering 
the stability of social and economic status between generations, 
ideological voting one generation removed.
Indeed Pomper*s example of white Southerners who remain faithful 
to the Democratic party despite its general pro-integration image, may 
upon closer scrutiny, actually be a dated example of ideological 
voting one generation removed. Declining Democratic support in the 
South over the last two Presidential elections--first such votes since 
the major civil rights legislation of the mid-1960s was enacted by a 
Democratic Congress under a Democratic President--may be symptomatic 
of Southerners* slow reaction to the party's shifting image.
Kevin Phillips argued in his work on The Emerging Republican
Ma.1 ority that white Southerners will make the switch and become part
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of the Republicans* own distinct nucleus for a winning coalition.
Others, too, concede that party images, and hence issue cues, 
may differ more than Scaramon and Wattenberg would prefer. Even 
Campbell and colleagues admitted that whereas "articulation between 
party program, party member opinion, and individual political decision 
is weak indeed, . * it may well be argued that we have imposed a
view of issues and policies that is unrealistically specific. Significant
differences do exist in the public images of the parties*’* (italics 
mine)^*
If this were true, voters would receive diverging cues on
issue positions, and voter surveys would detect alignments by party
allegiance and issue orientation dovetailing in at least some areas*
McCloskey and his colleagues, however, report little divergence between
groups of Republican and Democratic voters* Yet Donald Stokes, in his
1966 paper on ’’Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency,**
found that differing perceptions of the issue positions of the two
parties* candidates did play a role in voters* decisions, although
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the extent of that role is not clearly defined*
So perhaps necessary convergence leaves room for some distinctive 
appeals by the two parties* And perhaps that divergence, however 
slight, is perceived by the voters and plays at least a minor role in 
the voters* partisan choice, either immediately or in retrospect* The 
concession may seem slight, but it invites further investigation* If 
party cues may include a subtle hint at divergence from strict centrist 
positions, is it also possible that voters are capable of escaping the 
ties of early childhood affiliations and of choosing a party on more 
rational grounds? Is partisan loyalty keyed to more than parental 
guidance and platitudinous reinforcement?
For many voters, it seems possible that partisan affiliation 
is more than an inheritance* V.O. Key in his last work, The Responsible 
Electorate* Rationality in Presidential Voting* 1936-1960* argued that
»»voters on the average base their vote decisions on the issue positions
of the candidates and on their expectations concerning how the candidates
, ,43
would perform as President*" Key wrote the bool; m  an attempt to rebut 
some conclusions of Campbell and his associates* Khile Campbell e^ al» 
had argued that voters responded to party cues and acted principally 
in consequence with an enduring sense of party loyalty, Key responded 
that most voters base their electoral decision on a responsible and 
reasonable understanding of the candidates* positions and a desire to 
further their own interests.
"The perverse and unorthodox argument of this little book,"
44wrote Key shortly before his death, "is that voters are not fools."
To prove his point, Key analyzed the electorate in three groupss
"standpatters’* (those who vote for candidates of the same party in
successive elections) ; "switchers?* (those who vote for candidates of
differing parties in successive elections); and "new voters" (those
who did not vote in the previous election). For each group, Key
demonstrated what he considered a pattern of rational decision-making.
"In short, the data make it appear sensible to regard the voter
as a person who is concerned with what governments have done or not
done and what they propose to do rather than one guided, perhaps unaware,
45by the imperatives of economic status or the tricks of Madison Avenue," 
he wrote.
First-time voters tend generally to align themselves with the 
party which they perceive will best represent their own interests and
general philosophy, said Key# Their votes, he observed, are usually
consistent with their understanding of the parties* issue position
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and their own leaning on the issues#
"Switchers," he wrote, are not mindless wanderers between parties
whose positions they do not comprehend# Instead, " to an astonishing
degree # • voters in their movements to and fro across party lines
and from an inactive to an active voting status behaved as persons
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who made choices congruent with their policy preferences#" The minority 
party usually gains the support of voters who "are disappointed by,
who disapprove of, or who regard themselves as injured by, the actions
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of the Administration," he said#
Key*s description seems to have been tailored as a refutation
of the Campbell group's image of independent voters as uninformed,
disinterested and casual participants#
Some observers move bravely to the conclusion that the fate of the 
Republic rests in the hands of an ignorant and uninformed sector 
of the electorate highly susceptible to influence by factors 
irrelevant to the solemn performance of its civic duties# That 
conclusion is certainly not invariably, if ever, correct* * • •
Instead the switchers, who (in company with the "new" voters) 
call the turn, are persons whose peculiarity is not lack of 
interest but agreement on broad political issues with the standpatters 
toward whom they shift. Democratic defectors diverge markedly 
from Democratic standpatters; Republican renegades likewise 
depart sharply from the policy views of Republican standpatters, • • 
This should be regarded as at least a modicum of evidence for the 
view that those who switch do so to support governmental policies 
or outlooks with which they agree, not jjecause of subtle psycho­
logical or sociological peculiarities#
Keyjestimated that between 12 and 20 per cent of the survivors
from a previous election switch their party allegiance in a succeeding
vote. The very existence of a large body of switchers would seem to 
cast a heavy doubt on the supposedly pervasive impact of early 
childhood loyalties and enduring allegiances*
Even among the standpatters, who stick with a party from one 
election to another, Key found a rational base for the decision not 
to switch® While enduring partisan loyalty may be cited as the 
reason for this fidelity, Key viewed the loyalty as only a symp­
tom of a basic agreement with the party*s orientation. He did not 
address the issue of opinion formation by the party, but implied 
that voters may be more independent-minded than as portrayed in 
The American Voter.
What of these voters who remain in the party ranks from 
election to election? Are they obtuse diehards who swallow 
their principles to stick by their party? . . .  on issue 
after issue those with views consistent with the outlook 
of their party stood pat in their voting preferences.
Notably few Republican defections occurred among those who 
subscribed to sound Republican doctrine. Democratic 
deserters were uniformly fewest among those who concurred 
with the pure and orthodox Democratic tenets of the time 
. . .  The facts seem to be that, on the average, the 
standpatters do not have to behave as mugwumps to keep 
their consciences clear; they are already where they ought 
to be in light of their policy attitudes . . .  Though 
partisan groupings of voters are not models of ideo­
logical purity, the standpatters of each party manifest 
fairly high agreement with the party positions as 
popularly perceived.
Key*s reference to **sound Republican doctrine,** **orthodox 
Democratic tenets of the time?’ and "party positions as popularly 
perceivecf* should not escape the reader's attention in light of 
the preceding discussion on necessary convergence and the blurring 
of party differences. An expanded examination of that portion of Key*
comment must be postponed briefly, however. It is the notion of 
rationality among standpatters which is of interest at this point.
Taken together, Key's analyses of the three groups leave a 
picture of voters whose decisions are triggered not by unseen 
pre-adolescent psychological influences, but by an understanding 
that one party's candidate offers greater compatibility of issue 
orientation than does his opponent.
"From our analysis the voter emerges as a person who appraises 
the actions of government, who has policy preferences, and who 
relates his vote to those appraisals and preferences," Key con­
cluded.^
Pomper also tied the voter's issue orientation to his concept 
of his own self-interest.
"For a great many voters, policy does have some relation to 
their party.preferences, although issues are not viewed philosoph­
ically," Pomper said.^
Fred Greenstein noted that while partisan loyalties develop 
initially among children at an early age, the child gradually learns 
to differentiate between the parties in terms of what they 
represent. Only a few adults remain ignorant of these distinctions 
in party stands, Greenstein wrote, while other voters relate the
distinctions to what is "best?* for their own group— peer, interest,
53region or whatever.*
These authors seem to agree that despite the lack of class
identity among voters, some basis for diverging issue orientation does
exist within the electorate. The scholars seem reluctant to pinpoint
the basis for such divergence, but seem willing to acknowledge its
presence and its impact on partisan choice.
Even KcCloskey, Hoffman and O'Hara, who demonstrated the lack ol
substantial issue conflict among party followers, conceded that they
were prepared to find "contrary influences" that would counteract
the voters* convergence.
"We believed that the homogenizing tendencies referred to are
strongly offset by contrary influences, and that voters are prepon-
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derantly led to support the party whose opinions they share." Unfor­
tunately, the authors neglected to define those "contrary influences."
Additional evidence of the potential for rational decision-making 
by voters can be found in the voluminous data of The American Voter. 
Data from both the 1952 and 1956 elections demonstrate that those who 
claim to be strong Democrats hold the most pro-Democratic views and
that strong Republicans hold the most pro-Republican attitudes
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toward the parties* candidates.
It is interesting to note also Pomper*s observation that party
identification among veteran voters must remain consistent with policy
preferences and that newer voters, whose allegiance to party is not
so solidly established, tend to follow personal opinion on the issues
as much as social or party cues.
Group pressures, traditions and propaganda do not explain elections. 
They are usually reinforced by opinion on issues. When party
identification or group membership is not consistent with policy 
preferences or other short-term forces, a significant proportion 
will desert their "natural" party. New voters, who are less com­
mitted, will follow thg^r opinions as much as their sociological 
or partisan instincts.
Whatever rationality is found in most voters is rarely based 
on the individual's philosophical understanding of the issue's 
ramifications and on a deliberate decision to support one side after 
a debate on merits of the issue, the authors seem to agree. Rather, 
the voters perceive some cue, perhaps indirect, in a party's or candi­
date's appeal which triggers a feeling of sympathy. Likely, the cue 
will relate to some group interest with which the voter is familiar, 
although perhaps not fully knowledgeable. In other words, Pomper 
and Key do not attempt to argue that American voters are ideologues 
or philosophers, but simply, as Key put it, that they "are not 
fools."
The caution they raise is that a scarcity of the true philo­
sophical citizen may lead some to conclude that all voters are putty 
to be manipulated by pervasive social and political forces. The 
impact of such factors as psychological and sociological cues decreases, 
one might argue, when the parties effectively perform the second of the 
two party goals previously discussed--articulation of issue positions. 
When alternatives are presented, the voters will respond. In the 
absence of such distinctions, the voter is forced to choose between 
party labels and between candidate appeals.
Sorauf, among others, argued that the Democratic and Republican
parties, while not ignoring issues, sent out only subtle cues to the
electorate through the 1960s*
The American parties spell out policy stands tentatively and vaguely* 
They do not have a flair for enunciating principles, nor do they 
speak in one clear ideological voice* They do, as their critics 
charge, bow before all the limits the political system sets to 
their statement of programs and ideologies* But of the charge of 
disregarding interest and policy issues altogether they are not 
guilty*57
This subtlety of approach, combined with the voters* hesitance
to make distinctions between the parties except in the presence of cues
initiated by the party, may combine to cause the very centrism which
,in turn encourages the parties to mimimize their differences* The
phenomenon may, in fact, be a circular and self-sustaining one*
Flanigan, too, noted the subtlety with which parties signal
their members on issue positions* Frequently, the leadership of the
two parties are in agreement on an issue, he observed* At other
times, the leadership factions of each party may be split among them-
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selves, resulting in no clear cue gaining expression*
Also, Campbell and his associates stated that even if the voter
is conscious of an issue and concerned about it, it will have no effect
on his partisan decision or ballot unless he perceives some distinction
59in two parties* positions*
As David W. Abbott and Edward T* Rogowsky argue in their paper,
"The Linkage Processs An Essay on Parties and Opiaion,"x
At certain junctures there are virtually no differences in the 
policy stances of the candidates of the two parties on important 
issues* This condition is not very serious in a period of general 
consensus* However, when public opinion is deeply divided and when
both parties have chosen candidates who take almost identical 
positions on a nationally divisive issue, then the members of the 
dissenting minority are denied an opportunity to represent their 
opinions by voting* The virtually identical Viet Nam positions 
of the Republican and Democratic party nominees in 1968 is a case 
in point*
The crucial distinction which emerges from these arguments i^
between periods in which the party system puts out only very subtle
issue cues and periods in which true issue divergence develops and
voters become aware of a comprehensible split between leadership
factions of the two parties*
The importance of this distinction— the acknowledgement that
political context is also a variable that must be weighed in any analysis
of voting behavior— will now be the focus of this discussion*
Walter DeVries and V* Lance Tarrance in The Ticket Splitter note
that the political context of the 1960s was different from that of the
1950s* The decade of Kennedy, Johnson, Vietnam and race riots was
"politically turbulent" and produced significant change in America's
political situation, they said*
Some observers have seen these changes in the 1960s as a major 
realignment of the two political parties* Others have thought 
they detected the emergence of new coalitions of voters or the 
building of new majorities. In fact, some analysts believe that 
we are experiencing the disintegration of the two-party system 
as we have known it, arguing that if this trend continues, the 
Republican and Democratic parties may be completely removed as 
the major variables in most elections* A few analysts now 
believe that rather than party, the issues, the candidates' 
views, and the use of media both by the candidates and by the 
voters are now the most important factors in a voter's decision* 
Whatever the explanation, we do know that something happened 
to American voters during the politically turbulent years from 
1960 to 1970* Those years produced a whole set of political 
paradoxes which have yet to be explained*5*
Perhaps the most significant observation V.Q. Key made in The
Responsible Electorate was that:
To be sure, many individual voters act in odd ways indeed; yet, 
in the large, the electorate behaves about as rationally and respon 
sibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the alternatives 
presented to it and the character of the information available to 
it. (italics mine)02
Much of the body of knowledge of American voting behavior has 
stemmed from surveys conducted during the 1950s. The American Voter 
and "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers" 
have had a significant impact on later works in the field.
Perhaps a reassessment of the findings of those studies is in 
order to determine whether they remain valid descriptions of the 
electorate after fifteen or twenty years. It certainly is possible 
that the "clarity of alternative^’ presented to voters during the 
1950s was greater or lesser than in more recent years®
Many of the precepts of the argument for necessary convergence 
grew specifically out of the work of Campbell and McCloskey and their 
colleagues. Perhaps a re-examination of those research projects in 
particular is due.
Do voters in the 1970s remain clustered in the center of the 
spectrum? Does no significant divergence exist among party followers? 
Or is it possible that voters in the 1970s have responded to a greater 
clarity of alternatives by moving apart, attracted by divergent issue 
appeals from the parties?
Pomper published an article in 1972 which reviewed the role of
issues in Presidential balloting from 1956 to 1968. It is a valuable 
contribution to the study of voting behavior.
Using data from the Survey Research Center at the University of 
Michigan, Pomper examined quadrennial election studies for the period 
under investigation, analyzing voter responses to six specific policy 
questions. The items examined were: aid to education, medical care,
job guarantee, fair employment, school integration and foreign aid.
According to Pomper, while partisan identifiers differed somewhat 
in their approaches to these issues in the 1956 and 1960 samples, a 
far more significant distinction emerged in the 1964 sample. Perceptions 
of the linkage between party and policy showed a similar pattern 
through the four measurements, he said.
From this data, Pomper drew three broad implications. First, i
should be recognized that the election of 1964 was a critical one,
'*initiating a new political era in the United States, rather than the
abberant event it appeared at the time . . _** Characteristic of such
critical elections, said Pomper, is **increased voter consciousness
of policy questions, and the later electoral persistence of group
divisions based on the policy questions raised in the critical elec-
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tion.M (italics mine)
In 1964 and again in 1968, voters aligned their partisan loyalties 
in much closer harmony with their policy preferences than they had in 
either 1956 or 1960, he discovered.
Second, Pomper indicated that these findings point to the possible
development of a ’’responsible two-party systeirf* in the United States.
A committee of the American Political Science Association studied the 
two-party system in 1950 and recommended several changes to bring about 
such a responsible system.
’’Responsible two-party systeirf' means a system in which the parties 
are characterized by distinctively perceived policy positions, and in 
which parties are relatively cohesive, Pomper said. While he believed 
this was an unrealistic goal in the 1950s, he predicted it may be more 
obtainable in the 1970s. Twenty years ago, he wrote, ”0n most issues 
the voters did not relate their policy preferences to their partisan 
affiliations nor did they see a difference between the parties, nor 
did. they agree on the relative positions of the parties.”
Pomper saw changes in the voters during the latest election he
analyzed, however.
Parties can now meaningfully stand as ”groups of like-minded men” 
offering particular stances toward public issues. Their victories 
can now reasonably be interpreted as related to the mass choice 
of one set of issue positions over another. To this extent, the 
conditions for a responsible party system have been fulfilled.
In light of Pomper*s optimism, it is worthwhile to review briefly 
the prerequisites to a responsible party system stipulated by the APSA 
committee in its 1950 report.
”An effective party system,” the report said, "requires first,
that the parties are able to bring forth programs to which they conmit
themselves, and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal
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cohesion to carry out these programs.”
In a 1970 review of the committee’s report and progress in 
the intervening two decades, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, longtime executive 
secretary of the association and a member of the original study com­
mittee, delivered a critical evaluation of the 1950 report’s lack of 
"analysis, justification or clarification” and ” its popular missionary 
tone.”
Kirkpatrick’s criticism took three parts. First, he said, 
political parties do not appear competent to formulate policy to solve 
the nation’s complex problems. Second, even if they could develop the 
policies, it is unlikely, due to the lack of ideological cleavage in the 
American political system, that parties would present clear alternatives 
to the voters. Finally, even if such alternatives were presented to 
the electorate, the voters do not possess a sufficient level of issue 
information to be able to choose intelligently from among them. He 
cited voting studies (of the 1950s) to show that voters base their 
partisan choice on nonrational factors.
"The cumulative impact of voting studies on the committee model
of responsible party doctrine,” said Kirkpatrick, "is quite simply 
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devastating •"
Pomper countered Kirkpatrick’s traditionalist arguments with 
references to more recent voting studies, showing new patterns of voting 
behavior which, he said, more adequately support the supposition that, 
given the proper impetus, a "responsible?* party system could work.
Pomper cautioned, however, that before this goal can be achieved,
the parties must become more cohesive than they were in 1968.
Pomper*s final point was a particularly significant one in light 
jf the notion previously expressed that voting behavior studies 
conducted during the 1950s have had a pervasive impact on political 
science and perhaps are in need of re-examination to determine if a 
measurement fifteen or twenty years later will produce the same results.
The study of voting behavior has suffered, Pomper argued, from an 
over-generalization on the basis of cross-sectional research, such as 
The American Voter and the article by McCloskey €5t al. Of The Ameri can 
Voter, he said: "We have assumed that this superb analysis of the 1950s
is a study of the electorate of all time."68
It is crucial to study not only the behavior of voters, but also 
the political and social context in which that behavior occurs, he said. 
Various environmental stimuli must be considered, and their effects 
weighed.
It is significant to note that two of the authors of The American 
Voter. Philip E. Converse and Warren E. Miller, joined with two other 
researchers in the fall of 1969 to make a similar plea. In their report 
on a study of the 1968 election, the authors said:
. . .  some past findings have been to our mind "overinterpreted" 
as implying that issues are poorly linked to voting preferences 
because of innate and hence incorrigible cognitive deficiencies 
suffered by the mass electorate in the United States. Merely the 
Wallace data [[showing that Wallace voters in 1968 were motivated 
by a feeling of compatibility with the candidate on issue positions} 
taken alone would suffice to show, exactly as Key argued, that 
the public can relate policy controversies to its own estimates 
of the world and vote accordingly.
It is in light of this background of alleged "overinterpretation" 
that Pomper urged a "reinterpretation" of voting behavior studies of 
the 1950s by comparing the cross-sectional data of that decade to new 
measurements reflecting more current political climates. Changing 
political winds alter the voter, he argued.
If the voter is viewed as a microcosmic version of David Easton's 
political system analysis, he is understood to receive inputs from 
the environment around him and to produce outputs (decisions) from 
the raw material of those inputs. But with each new output, the environment 
is altered, and thus the inputs are varied. The system (or the voter) 
therefore operates in a constantly changing political environment.
It is shortsighted at best to expect the voter's outputs to 
remain constant during twenty years* change in the political context.
Pomper concluded:
Most critically, we must emphasize in this context the effect 
upon voters of the stimuli they receive from the parties and 
other electoral actors. If^  these stimuli are issueless and 
static, as they largely were in the 1950s, the citizenry is 
likely to respond in the manner described in The American Voter.
If these stimuli are more ideological and dynamic, we are 
likely to see different perceptions and behavior, such asnthat 
evidenced in the 1964 and 1968 elections, (italics mine)
In light of the information and arguments presented, it appears 
that a re-examination of the research reported by Herbert KcCloskey,
Paul J. Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara in their "Issue Conflict and 
Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," is warranted. As the 
preceding discussion demonstrates, their study has played a significant 
role in the development of a body of knowledge pertaining to American
voting behavior. It has now been fifteen years since they presented 
their findings and in that time the conclusions they propounded have 
been widely accepted and respected within the discipline. But their 
study was a single cross-sectional measurement.
On that basis alone, a re-examination appears justified. But as 
the following chapter will indicate, additional questions about the 
methodology and procedure-of McCloskey, Hoffman and 0,Hara*s research 
make a reappraisal of their conclusions even more necessary.
In view of the arguments presented above, and particularly the 
compelling argument by Pomper of the need for a re-examination of 
cross-sectional research, an hypothesis for the research presented 
herein was formulated. In the following pages, data will be presented 
to support and to confirm the hypothesis that: A re-examination of
levels of issue conflict between Democratic and Republican voters 
will reveal significantly higher levels of divergence than were 
discovered in similar research in 1957-58 by Herbert McCloskey, Paul 
J. Hoffman and Rosemary 0*Hara.
CHAPTER II 
THE McCLOSKEY-HOFFMAN-O'HARA STUDY
In June, I960, the American Political Science Review 
published an article on voting behavior by Herbert McCloskey, Paul 
J* Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara* The article was to have a profound 
impact on subsequent work in the field of voting behavior*
"Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers?* 
examined levels of issue conflict on major national issues between 
leaders of the Democratic and Republican parties and between groups 
of voters who identified with the Democrats and those who identified 
with the Republicans* The paper was one of several reports stem­
ming from research by the authors during 1957-58*
The authors hoped to determine whether leadership factions 
of the two parties differ significantly in their approaches to 
issues and whether the level of issue conflict among leadership 
factions is reflected among party "followers•**
They took note of the phenomenon of party convergence and 
its alleged necessity within the American party system and identified 
factors which contribute to this convergence* McCloskey and his 
colleagues believed that "contrary influences?* would lead to issue 
conflict between identifiers of the two parties* As previously noted 
here, the authors did not define such "contrary influences*"
The "Tweedledee-Tweed lediurf* view of the American party system 
is widely held among observers of U.S. politics, they noted. It is 
a view, however, which had never been investigated empirically, the 
authors contended.
"Although these •conclusions* are mainly derived from a priori 
analysis or from casual observations of * anecdotal* data (little 
systematic effort having been made so far to verify or refute them), 
they are often taken as confirmed— largely, one imagines, because 
they are compatible with certain conspicuous features of American 
politics."^
It was time, the authors had decided, for a careful examination 
of the "Tweed1edee-Tweedleduirf' assumption. Despite those "conspicuous 
features?' which seemed to evidence a party system in which differences 
were diminished, McCloskey and his associates believed that issue 
distinctions existed between Democratic and Republican voters.
To investigate this notion, the authors conducted a national 
survey of voters. In January, 1958, questionnaires were distributed 
to a randomly selected sample of voters. An identical questionnaire 
was distributed to delegates and alternate delegates to the Republican 
and Democratic national conventions of 1956.
The questionnaire included questions on party identification. 
Each person interviewed was asked to declare which of the parties 
he felt closer to. Also included was a list of twenty-four issues 
which the authors had determined were salient for that time. In
selecting the issues, the researchers sought to include those matters
of public policy which appeared to be "most significant and enduring."
For each of the twenty-four issues, each respondent was asked
to indicate whether he favored an "increase," "decrease?* or "no change
The issues were grouped in five categories: Public Ownership
of Resources; Government Regulation of the Economy; Equalitarianism
and Human Welfare; Tax Policy, and Foreign Policy.
The issues, by category, were:
I. Public Ownership of Resources
A« Public Ownership of Natural Resources 
B. Public Control of Atomic Energy
II. Government Regulation of the Economy
A. Level of Farm Price Supports
B. Government Regulation of Business
C. Enforcement of Anti-Monopoly Laws
D. Regulation of Trade Unions
E. Level of Tariffs
F. Restrictions on Credit
G. Regulation of Public Utilities
III. Equalitarianism and Human Welfare 
A* Federal Aid to Education
B. Slum Clearance and Public Housing
C. Social Security Benefits
D. Minimum Wages
E. Enforcement of Integration
F. Immigration into the United States
IV. Tax Policy
A. Corporate Income Tax
B. Tax on Large Incomes 
C m  Tax on Business
D. Tax on Middle Incomes
E. Tax on Small Incomes
V. Foreign Policy
A. Reliance on the United Nations
B. American Participation in Military Alliances
C. Foreign Aid
D. Defense Spending
The samples to which the questionnaire was administered were 
divided to form four comparison groups: (1) Democratic leaders,
(2) Republican leaders, (3) Democratic followers, (4) Republican 
followers*
For each response, a quantitative value was assigned as follows: 
"increase?'— 1.0, "decrease?*— 0, and "no change?' — 0.5. For each issue, 
the values of each response in a comparison group were summed and 
divided by the number of respondents in the group (N). The figure 
which resulted from this computation was labeled a "ratio of support 
score*"
When all computations were completed, the ratio of support 
scores on an issue were compared and the amount of difference in 
their values determined* The figure which represented the dif­
ference in ratio of support scores between two groups was considered 
an index of issue conflict for that group*
The researchers had anticipated that a comparison of scores 
for the delegations to the party conventions would indicate that 
significant issue conflict separates the elite factions of leadership 
of the Democrats and the Republicans* By the authors® interpretation, 
the data confirm this view* (See Tables 1 and 2*)
While McCloskey, Hoffman and 0*Hara failed to state their 
definition of statistical significance for these figures, they implied 
that the data show "that the leaders differ significantly on 23 of the 
24 issues listed and that they are separated on 15c.of these issues by *18 
or more ratio points— in short, by differences that are • • very large."^3
TABLE 1
MEAN RATIO OF SUPPORT SCORES FOR PARTY LEADERS
IN THE McCLOSKEY TEAM'S STUDY, BY CATEGORY
Categories Democrats* 
Mean Score 
(N«1,788)
Republicans* 
Mean Score 
(N-1,232)
Mean Level 
of
Conflict
Public Ownership 
of Resources • 76 *48 .28
Government 
Regulation 
of the Economy .59
00• .11
Equalitarianism 
and
Human Welfare .71 .50 .21
Tax Policy .36 .19 .17
Foreign Policy .54 .39 .15
Compiled from: Herbert McCloskey, Paul J* Hoffman, and 
Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders 
and Followers," in Political Parties and Political Behavior, ed* by 
William J. Crotty, Donald M* Freeman and Douglas S« Gatlin (Bostons 
Allyn and Bacon, Inc*, 1966), pp* 196-204*
TABLE 2
RATIO OF SUPPORT SCORES FOR PARTY LEADER^
IN THE McCLOSKEY TEAM'S STUDY, BY ISSUE
Issue Democrats'
Score
(N-1,788)
Republicans*
Score
(N-1,232)
Level of 
Issue 
Conflict
Public Ownership 
of Natural 
Resources .69 .30 .39
Public Control 
of Atomic Energy .83 .65 .18
Level of Farm 
Price Supports .58 .20 .38
Government
Regulation of 
Business .41 . o 00 .33
Enforcement of
Anti-Monopoly Laws
00CO. .68
oCM.
Regulation of 
Trade Unions .73 .91 .18
Level of Tariffs .35 .46 • 11
Restrictions 
on Credit .43 .50 .07
TABLE 2--CONTINUED
Issue Democrats*
Score
(N-1,788)
Republicans*
Score
(N«l,232)
Level of 
Issue 
Conflict
Regulation of 
Public Utilities .76 .50 .26
Federal Aid 
to Education .76 • 40 .36
Slum Clearance and 
Public Housing • 86 .59 .27
Social Security 
Benefits .78 .55 .23
Minimum Wages .73 .52 • 21
Enforcement of 
Integration • 59 .47 .12
Immigration into 
the United States .54 .44 .10
Corporate Income Tax .54 .21 .33
Tax on Large Incomes .52 .24 .28
Tax on Business .22
TABLE 2— CONTINUED
Issue Democrats*
Score
(N«l,788)
Republicans*
Score
(N-1,232)
Level of 
Issue 
Conflict
Tax on Middle 
Incomes • 26
00• • o 00
Tax on Small Incomes • 11 .19 •08
Reliance on
the United Nations • 66 .45 .21
American Participation 
in Military 
Alliances • 62 .48 .14
Foreign Aid .33 •23 .10
Defense Spending .43 •40 .03
Compiled from: Herbert McCloskey, Paul J. Hoffman, and 
Rosemary OfHara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus ;Among Party Leaders 
and Followers,*' in Political Parties and Political Behavior» ed. by 
William J. Crotty, Donald M. Freeman and Douglas S. Gatlin (Bostons 
Allyn and Bacon, Inc*, 1966), pp. 196-204.
Careful examination of the data in Tables 1 and 2 seems to
reveal that the threshold for "significance?' employed by Mccloskey
et al. falls somewhere between differences of .03 ratio points
(considered not significant) and *07 ratio points (apparently
considered significant)•
The authors conclude that:
Despite the brokerage tendency of the American parties, their 
active members are obviously separated by large and important 
differences* The differences, moreover, conform with the 
popular image in which the Democratic party is seen as the more 
"progressive?* or "radical," the Republicans as the more 
"moderate?* or "conservative'* of the two. In addition, the 
disagreements are remarkably consistent, a function not of 
chance»but of systematic points of view, whereby the res­
ponses to any one of these issues could reasonably have 
been predicted from knowledge of the responses to the other 
issues.^
The two groups were separated most widely on the issue of 
Public Ownership of Natural Resources, where conflict reached the 
•39 level. Closest harmony was found on the issue of Defense Spend­
ing, where the factions differed by only .03 ratio points. By cate - 
gory, Public Ownership of Resources evidenced the widest gap between 
scores while Foreign Policy matters showed the least divergence.
But even on Foreign Policy issues, the authors concluded, the con­
flict in issue attitudes between the two parties* leaders is "signif­
icant."
When McCloskey and his associates turned to data from the fol« 
lowers sample and compared self-identified Democratic party members 
with those who said they were Republicans, less issue conflict was 
apparent.
TABLE 3
MEAN RATIO OF SUPPORT SCORES FOR PARTY FOLLOWERS
IN THE 1958 NATIONAL SAMPLE, BY CATEGORY
Category Democrats* 
Mean Score 
(N-821)
Republicans* 
Mean Score 
(N-623)
Mean Level 
of
Conflict
Public Ownership 
of Resources .70 .66 •04
Government
Regulation of 
the Economy
00in• .53 .05
Equalitarianism and 
Human Welfare .70 .66 •04
Tax Policy .42 .38 •04
Foreign Policy .49 .47
CMO.
Note:
Although McCloskey, Hoffman and OfHara reported that 1,484 
questionnaires were returned in *® completely usable*1 form, their 
tables show a total N of only 1,444* The authors offered no 
explanation for this discrepancy.
Compiled from: Herbert McCloskey, Paul J. Hoffman, and 
Rosemary 0*Hara, " Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders 
and Followers,1* in Political Parties and Political Behavior, ed. by 
William J. Crotty, Donald M. Freeman and Douglas S. Gatlin (Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1966), pp. 196-204.
TABLE 4
RATIO OF SUPPORT SCORES FOR PARTY FOLLCIWgRS
IN THE 1958 NATIONAL SAMPLE, BY ISSUE
Issue Democrats*
Score
(N-821)
Republicans*
Score
(N-623)
Level of 
Issue 
Conflict
Public Ownership 
of Natural 
Resources • 60 .56 .04
Public Control of 
Atomic Energy .70 •66 • 04
Level of Farm 
Price Supports .56 • 41 .15
Government 
Regulation of 
Business .43 .31 • 12
Enforcement of
Anti-Monopoly Laws .73 .72 .01
Regulation of 
Trade Unions .69 .74 .05
Level of Tariffs .46 .47 .01
Restrictions 
on Credit .58 .53 .05
TABLE 4--C0NTINUED
Issue Democrats*
Score
(N-821)
Republicans*
Score
(N«*623)
Level of 
Issue 
Conflict
Regulation of
Public Utilities .64 .57 .07
Federal Aid 
to Education .85 .78 .07
Slum Clearance and 
Public Housing
GO• CM00. .05
Social Security 
Benefits .83 .77 .06
Minimum Kages .78 .69 .09
Enforcement of 
Integration .57 .59 .02
Immigration into 
the United States .29 .32 .03
Corporate Income Tax .56 .49 .07
Tax on Large Incomes . 66 .56 .10
Tax on Business .50 .42 *08
TABLE 4— CONTINUED
Issue Democrats*
Score
(N-821)
Republicans*
Score
(N~623)
Level of 
Issue 
Conflict
Tax on Kiddle 
Incomes .28 .29 .01
Tax on Small Incomes .12 .16 .04
Reliance on the 
United Nations .59 .57
CMO.
American Participation 
in Military 
Alliances .62 .58 .04
Foreign Aid .26 .26 .00
Defense Spending .67 .65 . o to
Compiled from: Herbert McCloskey, Paul J. Hoffman, and 
Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders 
and Followers," in Political Parties and Political Behavior, ed. by 
William J. Crotty, Donald M. Freeman and Douglas S. Gatlin (Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1966), pp. 196-204.
"The observation most clearly warranted from these data is 
that the rank and file members of the two parties are far less 
divided than their party leaders," they wrote. "Not only do they 
diverge significantly on fewer issues--seven as compared with 
twenty-three for the leader samples--but the magnitudes of the 
differences in their ratio scores are substantially smaller for 
every one of the twenty-four issues."^
No index of conflict was greater then .14 for the followers* 
samples. On the majority of issues, the disparity was less than 
.05.
The authors noted a pattern in the data:
All the issues on which the followers significantly disagree 
are of the "bread and butter1* variety, the more symbolic 
issues being so remotely experienced and so vaguely grasped 
that rank and file voters are often unable to identify them 
with either party. Policies affecting farm prices, business 
regulation, taxes, or minimum wages, by contrast, are quickly 
felt by the groups to whom they are addressed and are there­
fore more capable of arousing partisan identifications. It 
should also be noted that while the average differences are 
small for all five categories, they are smallest of all for 
foreign policy--the most removed and ifast well understood 
groups of issues in the entire array.
In further examinations of their data, McCloskey and his 
colleagues concluded that "there is substantial consensus on national 
issues between Democratic leaders and Democratic and Republican 
followers, while the Republican leaders are separated not only from 
the Democrats but from their own rank and file members as w e l l . " 77 
Republican followers were found to be in greater agreement on the 
issues with Democratic leaders than with the leaders of their own
party* The strongest pattern of consensus was found between
78Democratic followers and their leaders*
The authors drew six conclusions from their findings* First, 
they wrote, despite the assumption that the two American parties 
are identical in doctrine and policy, the Democratic and Republican 
leadership cadres were shown to be "distinct communities of 
co-believers who diverge sharply on many important issues." In 
addition, the apparent negative reaction by Republican followers 
to some stands taken by the Republican leadership can be taken as 
an indication "that the parties submit to the demands of their 
constituents less slavishly than is commonly supposed," they wrote*^ 
Second, the leadership groups are most widely separated on those 
issues "that grow out of their group identification and support— out 
of the managerial, proletary, and high-status connections of the 
one, and the labor, minority, low-status, and intellectual connec­
tions of the other* The opinions of each party elite are linked 
less by chance than by membership in a-common ideological d o m a i n . " ® *
A third conclusion summarized the lack of divergence among 
followers*
Whereas the leaders of the two parties diverge strongly, their 
followers differ only moderately in their attitudes toward 
issues* The hypothesis that party beliefs unite adherents and 
bring them into the party ranks may hold for the more active 
members of a mass party but not for its rank and file 
members • • « However, we cannot presently conclude that 
ideology exerts no influence over the habits of party support, 
for the followers do differ significantly and in the predicted 
directions on some issues* (Italics mine)®!
Next, the authors argue, leaders are more articulate, informed 
and involved, and therefore can be expected more readily to diverge 
on issues*
"If the leaders of the two parties are not always candid
about their disagreements, the reason may well be that they sense
the great measure of consensus to be found among the electorate*,,®2
Here the authors seemed to imply that while the leaders do not ignore
a possible cleavage among the voters, their public presentations of
issue stands (cues) are muted to avoid offending what they perceive
as consensus among voters*
The fifth conclusion, actually a reservation, is that while
leaders may diverge on the issues, they do not necessarily act on
the basis of their opinions* Different opinions between the
leadership factions is not prima facie evidence "that the two
83parties are, in practice, governed by different outlooks."
Finally, the authors concluded that the parties are not 
necessarily most internally cohesive on those issues which separate 
them clearly from the other parties* attitudes*
The effect of these conclusions most relevant to this 
discussion is that, in one of the most widely respected and best 
known examinations of issue conflict in the literature of voting 
behavior, the notion of necessary convergence is not disconfirmed, 
and that conclusions of the authors of that study lend support to 
the notion*
Some observers apparently assumed, perhaps on the basis of a 
shallow understanding of the findings, that the notion of necessary 
convergence was confirmed by the data from the McCloskey team’s study. 
If party leadership cliques diverge significantly on the issues but 
groups within the electorate do not, then it must be true that the 
leaders blunt their distinctive policy orientations during a 
campaign to attract the broadest possible support, according to the 
argument.
Before accepting this notion on the basis of the McCloskey 
team’s research, however, subsequent researchers are wise to examine 
carefully the procedure employed to reach those conclusions. Sev­
eral aspects of the research technique invite questions.
First, it is hazardous in empirical research to accept a
single cross-sectional measurement as evidence of a continuing phenom­
enon. Since McCloskey and his team conducted their voters survey in 
1958, little research has been attempted either to corroborate or 
to disconfirm their findings. On this basis alone, additional 
measurements seem warranted, or, at least, highly desirable.
Regardless of how well the original study was designed and
executed, it could measure levels of issue conflict and consensus 
only at one point in time. In the absence of additional evidence to 
confirm the findings, reliance on the authors* conclusions fifteen 
years later seems risky.
But in the case of the McCloskey-Hoffman-O’Hara article,
several shortcomings in the research design and the methodology 
seem to magnify the need for a closer look at the subject of their 
inquiry.
For the leadership samples, the problems in the research are 
glaring.
"Of the 6,848 delegates and alternates available to be 
sampled," the authors explained, "3,193 actually participated; 3,020 
(1,788 Democrats and 1,232 Republicans) completed and returned
0/i
questionnaires that were usable in all respects."
It appears that questionnaires were mailed to potential 
respondentsKfor the leadership sample, and if a recipient completed 
the questionnaire that was deemed "usable in all repects," he became 
a member of the sample. The authors do not explain the criteria 
by which a questionnaire was judged "usable in all respects," or how 
they decided to discard the 173 questionnaires which were returned, 
but were not in a "usable?* form.
In addition to the initial mailing— to deliver the questionnaire 
and explain the study— the researchers employed subsequent mailings 
to encourage participation.
They seemed pleased that roughly 44 per cent of the potential 
respondents submitted questionnaires which were useful for the 
study.
"This gratifyingly large number of returns of so lengthy and 
detailed a questionnaire was attained through a number of follow-up 
mailings and special letters."
The problem, however, is that when the potential respondent 
decided for himself whether to participate in the research, a 
significant potential for bias was introduced to the sample. I._ 
other words, in any experiment in which the subject is allowed to 
decide for himself whether to join the sample group, it becomes pos­
sible that those who do join will not accurately reflect a cross 
section of the group being studied. Does the 44 per cent mirror 
the attitudes and perceptions of the other 56 per cent? Or is 
there something different about those who declined to participate?
Is the sample representative? Does it serve as a microcosm of the 
entire population under scrutiny in the experiment? Or is a 
sample in which subjects with an aversion to filling out 
questionnaires are excluded truly representative of all the 
potential subjects?
Such questions are particularly important in a survey of 
attitudes, because the very decision not to participate in the 
survey may be evidence of an attitudinal distinction on the part of 
the non-joiners.
Similar problems exist in the sample of rank and file voters. 
Procedures for this sample were somewhat better, however, than for 
the leaders* groups. By arrangement with the American Institute of 
Public Opinion, the researchers selected two national cross section 
samples. Representatives of the institute personally distributed the 
questionnaire to 2,917 adult yoters who had been selected.
Of that number, 1,610— or 55 per cent— of the voters filled
out the questionnaire and returned it* Only 1,484 of the question-
86naires were judged "completely usable*" Again, standards of 
usefulness were not defined*
Participation, it seems, was voluntary* If the respondent 
chose not to return the questionnaire by mail, he was omitted 
from the final sample* No personal interviews were conducted*
As a result of these procedures, only 50*8 per cent of the 
voters originally selected for the sample completed the full ques­
tionnaire in an acceptable manner* Data from the followers* sample, 
then, was based on responses from slightly more than half of those 
voters selected originally for the study*
The authors apparently remained confident that their sample was 
not biased* The rank and file sample "closely matched the national 
population on such characteristics as sex, age, region, size of 
city, and party affiliation, and, though it somewhat oversampled
the upper educational levels, we considered it sufficiently large
87and representative for most of our purposes," the authors wrote*
In weighing the results of the research by McCloskey, Hoffman 
and 0*Hara, one must ask to what extent the potential bias resulting 
from selective participation may have affected the findings* Unfor­
tunately, however, no answer is available* All that is known is 
that the sample may have been an inaccurate reflection of the 
universe from which it was drawn* But that possibility alone is 
enough to cast doubt on the veracity of a researcher*s findings*
«?o
A final .caution regarding acceptance of the findings concerns 
the timing of the study* Perhaps this single measurement reflects a 
political climate which has changed significantly in the intervening 
years since the research data was gathered*
It has previously been noted that little corroborating evidence 
has been assembled since the study first was published fifteen years 
ago* In addition to that gap, the researcher in 1975 must wonder if 
a single cross sectional measurement reflects a situation which, even 
if portrayed accurately in the 1958 data, has since been altered by 
changes in the political climate of the United States*
Some might argue that the period during which the study was 
conducted by Mccloskey, Hoffman and O*Hara was, in terms of issue 
conflict between the two political parties, relatively quiescent 
compared to conditions in 1964, 1968 and 1972* Pomper has been 
quoted as arguing that a greater distinction of the parties’ issue 
stands emerged with the 1964 Presidential campaign and continued in 
1968* He described the decade of,the 1950s as characterized by 
political stimuli which were "issueless and static,** as opposed to 
those of the 1960s, which were more ” ideological and dynamic*”
Surely the clashes of Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater in 
1964 and of Richard Nixon and George McGovern in 1972 left with the 
voters a greater sense of diverging party positions than did the 
contests of Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson— contests marked 
largely by personality and party label competition*
The researcher who looks at data on issue conflict that was
collected during the 1950s must weigh whether the absence of 
clearly perceived divergence of the parties then necessarily pre­
supposes issue consensus and precludes divergence in the more 
turbulent years which followed.
In short, questions and even doubts about the reliability of 
McCloskey, Hoffman and O’Hara's conclusions after seventeen years 
of almost unchallenged acceptance seems to make desirable a 
re-examination of the questions they raised so articulately.
Such a re-examination is reported in the chapters which 
follow.
CHAPTER III
THE HARRISONBURG, VIRGINIA, POLITICAL ATTITUDES SURVEY
The McCloskey team was well-financed for its ambitious 
research effort. McCloskey himself received grants from the Com­
mittee on Political Behavior of the Social Research Council and 
from the Graduate School Research Fund and a Fellowship in Legal 
and Political Philosophy from the Rockefeller Foundation.
The subsequent re-examination attempt reported here was, 
on the contrary, severely limited in financial resources. 
Limitations in the scope of the re-examining study thus seemed 
necessary and prudent.
While subsamples of the American electorate are available 
in every town and county of the nation, access to a representative 
sample of party leaders is much more limited. An initial decision 
was made, therefore, to re-examine levels of issue conflict only 
among party followers and only in a small geographic area. No 
attempt was made to re-examine the levels of issue conflict among 
the group McCloskey et: al. identified as "party leaders.”
In the winter of 1972-1973, initial steps were taken to 
administer the relevant portions of the McCloskey team’s ques­
tionnaire to a sample of rank and file party members to determine 
levels of issue conflict between groups of Democratic and Republican
party identifiers.
The research project began with the selection of a site and 
the drawing of a sample. A questionnaire was composed and inter­
viewers were trained in administering the questions. Introductory 
letters to the sample were drafted, prepared and mailed. The data 
were gathered by personal interview and the results were tabulated. 
The data gathering process was completed during March, April and 
May, 1973.
Because it was impossible to survey a national cross section 
of the electorate, selection of a site from which to survey a sub­
sample was dictated primarily by matters of convenience to the 
researcher.
The city of Harrisonburg, Virginia,was chosen. Several factors 
contributed to the decision. First, Harrisonburg is located about 
180 miles from the researcher’s residence at that time, Williamsburg, 
Virginia, allowing frequent trips between the research site and the 
library, computer and faculty resources employed. During the 
months of data gathering, the research effort required as many 
as three trips a week between the research site and the College of 
William and Mary, in Williamsburg.
Second, the researcher had lived in Harrisonburg for nine 
months during the preceding year, and had a basic knowledge of its 
people, commerce and political climate. Third, assistance with 
survey interviews was available in Harrisonburg through the 
researcher’s acquaintance with two students majoring in political
science at Madison College there*
No assumption was made that Harrisonburg voters are in any 
way "typical” of voters in the United States* Any such allegation 
regarding any locality is, of course, highly questionable* On the 
contrary, the assumption was that no locality offered an electorate 
which could be relied upon as a microcosm of the nation’s* Selection 
by factors of convenience, then, seemed reasonable*
At the time of the research the city, which is located in the 
central Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, had a population of about 
18,000 persons with 7,810 registered voters* The five-man city 
council was composed of three Democrats and two Republicans* John 
Kenneth Robinson, a Republican from Winchester, represented the 
district (Va#-7) in the U.S. House of Representatives, having won 
his seat in 1970 and retained it in 1972 in repeat races against a 
Democratic candidate generally identified as "liberal*” Prior to 
1970, the district’s seat had been occupied for many years by 
conservative Democrat John 0* Marsh, now Counsellor to President 
Gerald R« Ford* Marsh traditionally had carried the city, as had 
Robinson in his 1970 and 1972 campaigns*
The city also had provided majorities for incumbent U.S. 
Senators William L. Scott, a freshman Republican, and Harry F*
Byrd Jr*, an Independent*
Sen* Byrd’s father, a conservative Democrat, had held the 
Senate seat now occupied by his son until his death in 1966* The 
elder Byrd, also of Winchester, had received support from the
voters of Harrisonburg during his many campaigns in Virginia* 
Although portions of the Shenandoah Valley, including Harrisonburg, 
have been called the nucleus of Republicanism in the state, the 
city also is generally acknowledged to have been part of the elder 
Byrd’s "stronghold*” This is due in part to a generally conserv­
ative trend among voters of the city, observers say*
Another factor contributing to Byrd’s popularity in the area 
may be the Byrd family’s ownership of the city’s sole newspaper,
The Dally News Record* The Washington Post and the Richmond 
Times-Disoatch also enjoy minority circulation in Harrisonburg*
One television station (WSVA-TV, an American Broadcasting 
Corporation affiliate) is located just outside the city limits in 
Rockingham County* Local viewers also receive stations from 
Washington, D.C., and Richmond by cable service, and some viewers 
in the city also can receive stations from Roanoke*
Three major employers contribute to the local economyt 
Dunham-Busch, Inc*, manufacturers of industrial and residential 
heating and cooling units; Walker Manufacturing Co«, makers of 
exhaust systems for automotive vehicles, and Madison College, 
a state-supported institution with an enrollment of about 7,000 
students*
Although various religious organizations play a role in the 
spiritual life of the community, Harrisonburg is known primarily 
as a center of the Mennonite faith* Eastern Mennonite College, 
one of the denomination’s two institutions of higher education, is
located in the city, as is an auxiliary school for primary and 
secondary instruction*
Specific percentages of racial groupings are not available, 
but the City Registrar estimated that, in 1973, less than 20 per 
cent of Harrisonburg’s voters were non-white*
The unemployment rate for the city was less than 2.5 per cent 
during the survey period, well below the national rate at that 
time*
The city’s growth has been steady, but, as if in contrast to 
the modern subdivisions, apartment complexes and shopping centers 
under construction in the spring of 1973, hitching posts still 
occupied a prominent place in municipal parking lots--for use by 
the horse-drawn carriages which still are maneuvered on the city 
stireets* Rich farmland surrounds the city and the economy of 
neighboring counties is dominated by agricultural pursuits*
It was the electorate of Harrisonburg, then, that served as 
the universe from which a sample of 100 persons was drawn* Randomly 
selected numbers were matched to a computer printout of voters’ names 
to select the potential respondents* names*
The researcher first obtained a copy of the list of all registered 
voters in the city as of January 31, 1973* By referring to a table 
of random numbers, the researcher then selected 100 random numbers 
between 1 and 7,810. The 100 persons whose place in the alphabetical 
listing of registered voters corresponded to the 100 randomly selected 
numbers thus became the members of the sample group*
Despite a recent effort by the City Registrar to purge the 
voters9 list of the names of persons known to have died, transferred 
their registration or residency or otherwise disqualified themselves 
as voters in Harrisonburg, several of those selected for the sample 
were found to be deceased or to be no longer residents of the city*
For these eight members of the sample, substitutes were selected by 
reference to the table of random numbers, using choices 101, 102,
103, etc*, as needed*
The members of the sample each received a letter in early spring 
of that year, advising them they had been selected to be interviewed 
as part of a study of voting behavior in the city* A copy of the 
letter is included in Appendix I* The letter informed the individuals 
that an interviewer would call on them at home and ask their cooper­
ation in completing a questionnaire*
More than half the total 100 interviews were conducted by 
the researcher himself* Others were completed by two college 
students whom the researcher had trained. The researcher accom­
panied the college students on early interviews and supervised 
their procedures*
In an effort to provide the most direct basis for comparison 
with the findings of the McCloskey team, the twenty-four issue por­
tion of the earlier questionnaire was adopted verbatim for the 
Harrisonburg survey* A copy of the questionnaire employed in the 
Harrisonburg interviews is included in Appendix II* McCloskey,
Hoffman and O’Hara had noted that these particular twenty-four
issues were selected for the original study because they were 
deemed to be of "enduring* significance*
Additional questions included on the 1973 questionnaire were 
items designed to determine the respondent’s age, sex, educational 
level, perception of income level, length of residency in the 
community and candidate preferences in the Presidential elections 
of 1964, 1968 and 1972.
Administration of the questionnaire to a respondent took 
about twenty minutes* All respondents were cooperative*
Party identification of the respondent was determined by 
response to three questions* The interviewer first asked: "With 
respect to national politics, do you usually think of yourself as a 
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"
If the respondent indicated a partisan loyalty to one of the 
two major parties, the interviewer asked: "Would you call yourself 
a strong (Republican or Democrat) or a not very strong (Republican 
or Democrat)?"
If the respondent answered the first question with any response 
other than "Republican" or "Democrat/’ he was asked, "Do you think 
of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?"
Based on responses to these questions, the respondents were 
divided into three groups: (1) those who indicated a preference for 
the Republican Party (fifty of those interviewed); (2) those who said 
they were closer to the Democratic Party (forty of the respondents), 
and (3) those who stuck to their independent status and declined to
indicate a preference for either party (ten respondents). Since 
data tabulations were designed primarily to compare Democratic 
followers with Republican followers, the hard-core independent 
respondents were not included in those tables designed to reflect 
comparisons of party identifiers#
Subsequent tabulations which ignored party preference and 
compared respondents’ issue positions with respect to such factors 
as age, income level, education level and Presidential preference 
in 1972 included data from the independent respondents, however#
While the method of sample selection and the interview tech­
nique seem scientifically valid so as to engender confidence 
in the results of the Harrisonburg survey, there is additional 
evidence to bolster claims of accuracy for the research project#
One question on the interview form asked, "If a referendum 
were held to determine if restaurants in Harrisonburg would be 
allowed to serve mixed alcoholic drinks, how would you expect to 
vote?" The respondent was asked to reply either "Yes," "No," 
"Probably would not vote," or "Don’t know#"
The researcher had been made aware that some restaurateurs 
in the city were considering a petition drive to call such a refer­
endum# No public mention of the move had been made during the survey 
period#
The response to that question showed that 50 per cent of the 
sample would vote in favor of allowing sale of mixed drinks, 28 
per cent said they would vote "No," 11 per cent said "Don’t know,"
and another 11 per cent indicated they probably would not vote 
on the issue* Of those who did express an opinion on the question 
and said they probably would vote on the issue, 64 per cent said 
they would vote for approval and 36 per cent said they would vote 
"No,"
Leaders of the city Democratic and Republican committees and 
the editor of The Daily News Record * informed of the results on the 
question* were surprised and skeptical* They assumed* as did some 
of the restaurateurs, that the city*s voters would be hesitant to 
approve such a measure*
The referendum was held in November, 1973* and the proposal 
was approved by more than 60 per cent of those who voted--approximately 
the percentage found in the survey six months prior to the vote*
(A summary of the election and referendum results is available in 
the State Board of Elections* bulletin of voting tabulations for 
November* 1973*)
Despite these reassurances of accuracy for the Harrisonburg 
survey* it is necessary to remember that the Harrisonburg research 
project was a limited attempt to re-examine the findings of 
McCloskey* Hoffman and 0*Hara in their earlier national survey*
Because it examined only the voters of one Virginia city, the 
survey cannot be presented as a replication of the earlier research*
The attempt, again, is merely to re-examine the earlier findings 
with reference to one locality to determine if they are valid for 
rank and file party members in Harrisonburg* Virginia* during 1973.
That disclaimer notwithstanding, the findings which resulted 
from the Harrisonburg research project provide an enlightening and 
significant update to the original study*
CHAPTER IV
ISSUE CONFLICT AMONG HARRISONBURG VOTERS
Results of the Harrisonburg study differed from those of the 
1953 survey of party followers by McCloskey and his colleagues in 
startling proportion* The average of issue conflict levels on all 
twenty-four issues among the Democratic and Republican identifiers 
surveyed in 1973 was three times greater than the comparable figure 
for the 1958 study*
Conflict between Democrats and Republicans in the 1973 study 
averaged *157 ratio of support points for the twenty-four issue list* 
This compares with an average (mean) conflict of only *050 points 
for the "followers" sample of the McCloskey-Hoffman-0#Hara survey*
(See Table 5*)
In the 1958 study, the single widest divergence between Democrats 
and Republicans was on the issue of Farm Price Supports, where the 
groups were separated by *15 ratio points* The Harrisonburg study, 
however, showed differences of *15 or greater occurred on thirteen 
issues* The greatest divergence, on Regulation of Trade Unions, was 
•31 points— more than twice the largest gap in the 1958 study* (See 
Table 6*)
McCloskey and his colleagues claimed their data show *'signif­
icant" differences in ratio scores on eight of the twenty-four issues*
TABLE 5
MEAN LEVELS OF ISSUE CONFLICT FOR PARTY FOLLOWERS 
IN THE 1958 NATIONAL SAMPLE AND 
IN THE 1973 HARRISONBURG SAMPLE
Sample Group
Mean Level 
of
Issue Conflict
Democratic Followers versus 
Republican Followers,
1958 National Sample
•050
Democratic Followers versus 
Republican Followers,
1973 Harrisonburg Sample
.157
TABLE 6
RATIO OF SUPPORT SCORES FOR PARTY FOLLOWERS
IN THE 1973 HARRISONBURG SAMPLE
Issue
Democrats*
Score
(N-40)
Republicans*
Score
(N«50)
Level of 
Issue 
Conflict
Public Ownership 
of Natural 
Resources • 70 .51 .19
Public Control of 
Atomic Energy .73 .50 .23
Level of Farm 
Price Supports .62 .47 .15
Government
Regulation of 
Business .50 • 21 .29
Enforcement of
Anti-Monopoly Laws .68 .69 .01
Regulation of 
Trade Unions .51 .82 .31
Level of Tariffs .46 .57 • 11
Restrictions 
on Credit .47 .53 .06
TABLE 6— CONTINUED
Issue
Democrats*
Score
(N-40)
Republicans*
Score
(N«50)
Level of 
Issue 
Conflict
Regulation of
Public Utilities .68 •50 .18
Federal Aid 
to Education .87 .60 .27
Slum Clearance and 
Public Housing .91 »67 .24
Social Security 
Benefits .82 .77 .05
Minimum Wages .85 .57 .28
Enforcement of 
Integration .62 .38 • 24
Immigration into 
the United States .46 .34 .12
Corporate Income Tax .78 .50 .28
Tax on Large Incomes .90 .70 • 20
Tax on Business .67 .52 .15
TABLE 6— CONTINUED
Issue
Democrats*
Score
(N«40)
Republicans*
Score
(N»50)
Level of 
Issue 
Conflict
Tax on Middle 
Incomes .27 .29 • 0 2
Tax on Small Incomes .1 2
CMCM. « o
Reliance on the 
United Nations .55 .46 .09
American Participation 
in Military 
Alliances .30 .32 . 02
Foreign Aid .25
oCM. .05
Defense Spending .35 . 00 .13
Unfortunately, however, the authorsneglected to define their 
standard of "significance*1' Careful analysis of their data indicates 
that a difference of *07 ratio points or more apparently was consid­
ered "significant*"
If the same standard is applied to the data from the 1973
study, the number of "significant?* conflicts over issues increases
sharply to eighteen* (See Table 7*)
On two issues— Farm Price Supports and Enforcement of 
Anti-Monopoly Laws— the levels of conflict in the 1973 sample were 
identical to those of the 1958 national sample* On two other 
issues, conflict in the 1973 study actually was lower than in the 
earlier measurement* Conflict over Social Security Benefits dropped 
•01 ratio points from *06 to *05. American Participation in Mil­
itary Alliances provoked a conflict equal to only *02 ratio points,
down *02 from the *04 mark in the 1958 data*
On the remaining twenty issues, however, levels of issue con­
flict between groups of Democratic and Republican identifiers were 
markedly higher in the 1973 Harrisonburg survey than those reported 
by McCloskey, Hoffman and 0#Hara for the 1958 survey, as Table 7 
shows*
When the data from the two samples are compared by category, 
increases are noted in all five areas* Largest increases in levels 
of issue conflict occur in Public Ownership of Resources (up *17) 
and Equalitarianism and Human Welfare (up *15). The lowest conflict 
level in both studies and the slightest increase was in Foreign Policy* 
(See Table 8*)
TABLE 7
LEVELS OF 
IN THE 
1973
ISSUE CONFLICT FOR PARTY FOLLOWERS 
1958 NATIONAL SAMPLE AND IN THE 
HARRISONBURG SAMPLE, BY ISSUE
Issue
Level of 
Conflict, 
1958 
Sample
Level of 
Conflict, 
1973 
Sample
Change in 
Level of 
Conflict
Public Ownership 
of Natural 
Resources
+ .15
Public Control of 
Atomic Energy • 04 .23 + .19
Level of Farm 
Price Supports .15 .15 m m
Government Regulation 
of Business .12 .29 + .17
Enforcement of
Anti-Monopoly Laws .01 .01 —
Regulation of 
Trade Unions .05 .31 + .26
Level of Tariffs • 01 • 11 + .10
Restrictions on 
Credit .05 • 06 + .01
TABLE 7— CONTINUED
Issue
Level of 
Conflict, 
1958 
Sample
Level of 
Conflict, 
1973 
Sample
Change in 
Level of 
Conflict
Regulation of
Public Utilities .07 .18 + .11
Federal Aid 
to Education .07 .27 + . 20
Slum Clearance and 
Public Housing .05 .24 + .19
Social Security 
Benefits .06 .05 -.01
Minimum Wages .09 .28 + .19
Enforcement of 
Integration .02 .24 + .22
Immigration into 
the United States .03 • 12 + .09
Corporate Income Tax .07 •28 +.21
Tax on Large Incomes .10 .20 + .10
Tax on Business .08 .15 + .07
TABLE 7— CONTINUED
Issue
Level of 
Conflict, 
1958 
Sample
Level of 
Conflict, 
1973 
Sample
Change in 
Level of 
Conflict
Tax on Middle 
Incomes .01 .02 + .01
Tax on Small Incomes .04 .10 + .06
Reliance on the 
United Nations .02 .09 + .07
American Participation 
in Military 
Alliances
-.02
Foreign Aid •00 .05 +.05
Defense Spending .02 .13 +.11
TABLE 8
MEAN LEVELS OF ISSUE CONFLICT FOR PARTY FOLLOWERS
IN THE 1958 NATIONAL SAMPLE AND IN THE
1973 HARRISONBURG SAMPLE, BY CATEGORY
Category
Mean Level 
of Issue 
Conflict, 
1958 
Sample
Mean Level 
of Issue 
Conflict, 
1973 
Sample
Change in 
Mean Level 
of Issue 
Conflict
Public Ownership 
of Resources .04 • 21 + .17
Government
Regulation of 
the Economy
+ .10
Equalitarianism and 
Human Welfare .05 .20 +.15
Tax Policy .06 .15 + .09
Foreign Policy .02 .07 + .05
In the earlier research, McCloskey and his colleagues noted 
that conflict was greatest on issues with the most direct impact 
on the voters— matters pertaining to money. Conflict levels of 
•06 ratio points— greatest level of divergence by category— were 
recorded for both the Government Regulation of the Economy cate­
gory and the Tax Policy area in the 1958 data.
In the 1973 sample, however, domestic social concerns seemed 
to divide the Democrats and Republicans more than pocketbook issues. 
Conflict on Government Regulation of the Economy was third among 
categories at .10 ratio points. Tax Policy issues ranked fourth in 
level of conflict, with a .09 level separating the party groups.
On the issue of Public Ownership of Natural Resources, the 
McCloskey team’s research showed Democratic followers* support at 
•60 and Republican support at .56, for a conflict level of only .04. 
In the Harrisonburg study, however, Democrats had an aggregate 
ratio of support score of .70 while Republicans showed only .51 
support. The two parties seemed to move in opposite directions from 
the stands recorded in the earlier research. The level of conflict 
in 1973 was .19, up .15 points over the 1958 national sample.
Both party groups showed less support in the 1973 study for 
Public Control of Atomic Energy than was recorded in the earlier 
survey. Democrats in 1973 scored .73, down from .79, and Repub­
licans dropped to .50 from an earlier .75. Issue conflict increased 
from the McCloskey team’s measurement of .04 to a fairly high mark 
of .23.
The parties’ supporters also diverged more widely in opin­
ions regarding Government Regulation of Business in the 
Harrisonburg study than did the national sample as reported by 
McCloskey, Hoffman and O’Hara* The earlier .43-.31 Democratic 
to Republican split increased to a *50-*21 gap, thus increasing 
the conflict measurement from *12 points to *29*
Similar divergence over the Regulation of Public Utilities 
resulted in a conflict measurement for the 1973 sample of *18, 
up *11 over McCloskey and his colleagues* 1958 findings*
Democrats in the Harrisonburg sample reflected the same 
ratio of support score as their earlier counterparts on the issue 
of Level of Tariffs— .46* Republicans in the 1973 study, however, 
were more eager for an increase in tariffs than their counterparts 
had been, with the support score rising from *47 for the national 
group to *57 for the Harrisonburg group*
Democratic support decreased, while Republican support 
increased for Restrictions on Credit, but the level of conflict 
rose from *01 to *05 points* And while Democratic support for 
Federal Aid to Education was slightly higher in the Harrisonburg 
sample than in the earlier national group, Republican support 
among the Harrisonburg voters was down *18 points from the 1958 
measurement of national Republicans* Conflict on the issue rose 
from *07 to .27 ratio points.
In other areas of what McCloskey and his colleagues called the 
" Equal itari an ism and Human Welfare?' category, Republican support
among respondents in the Harrisonburg sample decreased from that of 
the national G.O.P. sample, while local Democrats* scores were 
higher than their predecessors. Conflict levels rose on all but 
the Social Security Benefits issue in this category. Conflict 
between the party groups was *19 points higher on Slum Clearance 
and Public Housing and on Minimum Wages, and .22 points higher 
on Enforcement of Integration. Republican support for Immigration 
into the United States increased slightly, and Democratic support 
increased briskly. Conflict on the issue rose by .09 ratio points 
to a level of .12.
While both Democrats and Republicans scored higher support 
marks in the 1973 study on taxes of Corporate Incomes, Large Incomes 
and Businesses, the Democratic jumps outstripped the Republicans*, 
and conflict on the three issues increased over the 1958 data.
Scores on the Tax on Middle Incomes issue were almost identical to 
those of the earlier study, but Republicans in Harrisonburg seemed 
more willing to increase Taxes on Small Incomes than their counter­
parts had been in the national sample, while Democrats in the 1973 
study mirrored their partisans* score in the earlier national data. 
Conflict on the issue increased slightly, from .04 in the 1958 
study to .10 in the subsequent research.
Support for Reliance on the United Nations and for Foreign 
Aid was less evident among voters of both parties in the 1973 group 
than it had been in the McCloskey-Hoffman-O*Hara study. Conflict 
over the U.N* rose .07 points in the Harrisonburg survey to a .09
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level* While there was apparent consensus in the earlier study on 
the Foreign Aid issue, the 1973 study reflected a conflict level of 
*05 points.
Although conflict on American Participation in Military 
Alliances was less among the 1973 sample than in the earlier data, 
a significant shift in the magnitude of support from both parties 
was evident* In the 1958 survey, the researchers found Democrats* 
support for the issue at *62 points, while Republicans scored *58. 
In the 1973 study, Democratic support for the matter had slipped to 
only *30 points and the Republicans scored only *32* This mutual 
sliding of support within roughly the same thin margin of conflict 
may be evidence of an enduring consensus between the parties on 
an issue about which attitudes have shifted in tandem over the 
last fifteen years*
A similar phenomenon is apparent in the data on the issue of 
Defense Spending* In the earlier study, Democratic support was 
recorded at the *67 level and Republicans scored *65— near consen­
sus* In the Harrisonburg sample, Democrats scored only *35 while 
the Republicans also had less support than the earlier national 
Republican sample* The Republican decrease to *48 was more mod­
erate than the Democrats, and conflict on the issue increased from 
•02 in the 1958 data to *13 points for the later sample* Again, the 
lower scores recorded by botfr parties may indicate a change in the 
public attitude and an alteration of the voters* positions on the 
issue, while the parties* positions vis a_ vis each other may have
changed less substantially*
Careful analysis of the data from the 1973 Harrisonburg study 
reveals that, of six variables, political party identification 
provides the greatest level of issue conflict among groups of 
respondents* Members of the sample also were divided into categories 
for comparison by age, income level, educational level, 1972 
Presidential preference and participation versus non-participation 
in the 1972 Presidential balloting* In each comparison, respond­
ents differed less sharply over the twenty-four issues than did 
blocs of party identifiers in 1973* Mean levels of issue 
conflict for the twenty-four issue list were tabulated for each 
comparison* When data for the comparison of party identifiers from 
the 1958 survey was added to the list of mean levels of issue 
conflict, it became apparent that while party identifiers in 
1973 differed more sharply than any other groups tabulated,
the 1958 party identifiers had the least conflict of all groups
considered* (See Table 9*)
As noted previously, the mean level of issue conflict for
the 1973 party identifiers was *157* The second highest mean
conflict was found in the comparison of McGovern voters to Nixon 
voters in the 1972 Presidential election* Divergence between the 
two groups reached a mean level of *128*
Respondents who claimed to have voted in the 1972 election 
were in conflict with those who said they had not gone to the polls 
by a mean score of *124*
TABLE 9
MEAN LEVELS OF ISSUE CONFLICT FOR SEVEN VARIABLES,
SIX FROM THE 1973 HARRISONBURG SAMPLE AND
ONE FROM THE 1958 NATIONAL SAMPLE
Variable Mean Level of Issue Conflict
Democratic Followers versus 
Republican Followers,
1973 Sample
.157
McGovern Voters versus 
Nixon Voters,
1973 Sample
.128
Voters versus Non-voters 
for President in 1972, 
1973 Sample
.124
Low and Lower Middle Income Group
versus Middle and Upper Middle Group, 
1973 Sample
• 085
Voters 35 and Under versus 
Those over 35 Years Old, 
1973 Sample
.078
Less Educated Voters versus 
Those with Education Beyond 
High School Diploma,
1973 Sample
.076
Democratic Followers versus 
Republican Followers,
1958 Sample
.050
As Table 9 indicates, those respondents who perceived their 
household income level as either "Low** or "Lower Middle" differed 
from those who considered themselves in the "Middle?* or "Upper 
Middle” bracket by a mean level of conflict of .085. Those between 
eighteen and thirty-five years of age conflicted with those 
thirty-six and older by a mean level of .078.
Respondents whose maximum educational advancement was not 
beyond high school graduation were in conflict with those who had 
some post-high-school educational experience by a mean score of 
.076.
But the average difference between Democrats and Republicans 
in the survey conducted in 1958 was a smaller figure— only .050. 
While it is possible that such differences would have been found 
among voters in Harrisonburg even during the period of the earlier 
research, it also seems possible that some intervening factor or 
set of factors has increased voters* tendencies to disagree with 
their fellow citizens on these twenty-four issues.
The relative ease with which levels of conflict greater than 
those demonstrated in the 1958 research are detected among groups 
of respondents in Harrisonburg who have no apparent reason to be 
in significant conflict over the range of issues seems to indicate 
one of two things. Either the voters of Harrisonburg are inclined 
to more divergent views on these issues than are voters in the 
U.S. as a whole, or, if Harrisonburg voters are more closely 
representative of the nation*s electorate, the situation has been
altered since the McCloskey team's reading of the national sample's 
responses in 1958. A third possibility, of course, is that the 
earlier data was simply inaccurate, even for the period in which the 
measurement was made.
In any event, the hypothesis that a re-examination of levels 
of issue conflict between Democratic and Republican followers would 
reveal significantly higher levels of divergence than were discovered 
in the 1958 national study is confirmed by the data from the 1973 
Harrisonburg survey. Levels of issue conflict between Democrats 
and Republicans sampled in Harrisonburg are indeed far greater than 
the conflict levels demonstrated in the McCloskey-Hoffman-O*Hara 
research.
Proving an increase in issue conflict levels among a sample 
of voters in Harrisonburg, Virginia, in 1973 does not disconfirm 
the findings of McCloskey and his colleagues in 1958. The results 
in Harrisonburg do not confirm a change in national political 
attitudes. Nevertheless, the data do seem to indicate the pos­
sibility that a change in the amount of divergence between 
Democratic identifiers and Republican identifiers may have occurred 
since the earlier measurement and that the parties' supporters 
now may be separated by a more clearly distinguishable gulf.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Like the study it sought to re-examine, the research project 
reported herein is a single, cross-sectional measurement. By the 
nature of such a study, the implications that may be drawn from 
the data are limited.
It may be significant to note, however, that studies by other 
researchers on the question of issue conflict between groups of party 
followers in recent years have resulted in findings which point in 
the same direction as those from the Harrisonburg study.
In their article, "Political Parties and Political Issues:
Patterns in Differentiation, 1940-1972," Everett Carll Ladd Jr. and
Charles D. Hadley explored data covering a thirty-two-year period
and sought to determine levels of "party distance,** or issue conflict.
The scope of their study spanned what Ladd and Hadley termed "the
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change-dominated years from FDR to Nixon.'*
The authors examined voting behavior from the period to 
determine the extent of differences on issue orientations between 
"behavioral" Democrats and Republicans as well as self-identified 
party supporters. By "behavioral" party members, they meant those 
voters who actually voted for the candidates of a given party, not 
merely those voters who declare themselves "closer to?* the party.
Ladd and Hadley concluded that there has been substantial 
issue distance in both foreign policy matters and domestic issues 
throughout the period, although such differences were of less mag­
nitude during the middle 1950s than at other times* Differences on
foreign policy matters have been less dramatic than those on dom-
89estic issues, they said*
"Since 1940 (and presumably since the beginning of the New
Deal), there have been sharp Republican-Democratic differences
across virtually the whole range of domestic and social welfare
matters,” Ladd and Hadley wrote* Although less clearly defined
by the data, differences in foreign policy matters "are substantial
90and hardly random," they added.
Civil rights issues divided party adherents throughout the
period, the authors observed, although the width of the attitudinal
gap is more pronounced during the 1960s and early 1970s (when such
issues gained greater salience) than in the 1940s and 1950s* The
apparent impact of changing political context on levels of issue
conflict here should not be ignored*
The authors noted specifically that party distance during
"Eisenhower's 'era of good feeling'" was less "than in subsequent 
91years•"
The data of McCloskey, Hoffman and O'Hara were among those 
analyzed by Ladd and Hadley* They concluded that the McCloskey 
team's findings, when compared to data for the entire period 1940 
to 1972, showed lower levels of party distance (or issue conflict)
than was apparent for other years* This observation supports the
notion that McCloskey and his associates* measurement reflected a
relatively quiescent period in recent U.S. politics and that changes
in political context are significantly related to variations in the
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level of issue conflict between blocs of party followers*
Ladd and Hadley attempted to put their findings in perspec­
tive* They acknowledged that "the structure of the American
two-party arrangement has served as a factor working to reduce
93inter-party differences on most political questions." They 
also observed, as was noted here earlier, that a 11narrow coalition 
operating in a multi-party systenf' has an easier time maintaining 
a high level of issue coherence and cohesiveness among its 
supporters* A mass party in a two-party system, however, must 
"accommodate conflicting aims of diverse groups," the authors wrote* 
"Since it is internally heterogeneous, its collective distinc­
tiveness from its opponents must be relatively modest." Each of 
the two major American parties is "an unwieldy diffuse alignment
of state and local units, and of a broad range of social groups,"
94they wrote*
In light of these observations about the nature of American 
political parties, Ladd and Hadley contended that the levels of 
issue conflict demonstrated in their data were of great significance* 
With such entrenched factors at work to minimize attitudinal dis­
agreement, any conflict between party blocs is noteworthy, they 
said*
In this context, the inter-party distance which we documented 
for the period since 1940 must be seen as remarkably sub­
stantial* Data presented • • • ,showing a pattern of con­
sistent and persistent differences between the citizenry parties 
on a wide range of issues, are all the more striking, that is, 
because of what is perhaps the most salient feature of the 
American party system, the broadly inclusive "umbrella?1 
character of the coalitions*
Ladd and Hadley's comments, of course, are equally applicable 
to the results of the 1973 Harrisonburg survey*
The Ladd and Hadley data lend support to the notion that 
issue" conflict levels may have increased nationwide among party 
followers since the period of the McCloskey team's research.
The Harrisonburg data, too, seem to imply development of greater 
levels of conflict between party blocs than was evident in the report 
of the 1958 survey.
Neither the Ladd and Hadley data nor the Harrisonburg results 
prove conclusively that issue conflict for U.S# voters has, in fact, 
increased* That could be proved only by comparing two or more 
compatible sets of data* Unfortunately, the McCloskey team's 
questionnaire apparently has not been re-administered to a 
national sample under the same procedures as originally employed.
On the basis of these more recent findings, however, the question 
may at least be raised more forcefully than before.
The data from the Harrisonburg survey prove very little about 
the nature of the American system of political parties* Most of the 
broad issues and arguments presented in Chapter One of this paper 
remain unanswered*
The scope of accomplishment for the research project reported 
here is relatively small— a narrowly drawn hypothesis appears to 
have been confirmed by the data* The 1973 survey of voters in 
Harrisonburg did indeed discover higher levels of issue conflict 
than were reported for the ”followers” portion of the 1958 
national study*
It is proved, therefore, that the level of issue conflict 
between democratic and Republican identifiers in one city of 
Virginia during the spring of 1973 was higher on twenty-four 
specific national issues than between democratic and Republican 
followers in a nationwide sample surveyed fifteen years previously* 
Little else can be said with certainty, based solely on the 
data gathered during the project and analyzed above*
The certainty of this one discovery, however, leads 
inevitably to speculation on other matters* Based on the McCloskey 
team's findings, it was believed likely that voters in Harrisonburg, 
as in the nation as a whole, would be clustered around a single 
viewpoint on each issue, with little or no issue conflict 
separating the parties' supporters. That was not the case for 
Harri sonburg, however•
If the level of issue conflict in Harrisonburg in 1973 did not 
follow the national pattern expressed in the 1958 data, perhaps 
it would not do so in other localities* Perhaps parties' sup­
porters in other portions of the United States are similarly 
divided by conflicts over issues of national policy*
If this is the case, and voters are divided on the issues 
along lines of party loyalty, the notion of necessary convergence 
is due for careful re-analysis* If party constituencies are 
diverging bodies of voters, then perhaps the parties themselves 
can diverge more dramatically at the leadership level without 
fear of losing support of their followers* Perhaps the lack 
of candor which McCloskey, Hoffman and O'Hara noted among party 
leaders can give way to more straightforward pronouncements of 
the leaders' positions* In short, if the voters are not 
clustered around a single viewpoint but are separated in 
partisan blocs which hold distinctive positions, then the parties, 
too, can become distinctive alternatives to each other*
Perhaps the parties already are distinct alternatives and 
the divergence of the voters is a reaction to divergent party 
cues* Or perhaps the voters have drifted apart independent of 
party cues and the parties now are in a position to react to 
the voters' movement*
In any event, the idea that parties must converge is 
subject to question, and researchers with greater resources and 
patience should direct further investigations in this direction.
It is tempting to postulate that the 1970s may be character­
ized by significantly greater national conflict on these 
twenty-four issues than were the 1950s, and that the political 
context already has changed dramatically, altering with it the 
political landscape of the American electorate. While the pos­
sibility of such a change in the nature of the American voter may 
not comfort those engaged in the painstaking process of cataloguing 
the characteristics of the electorate, perhaps the possibility offers 
an important message to researchers in the field of voting behavior* 
the voter may not be so one-dimensional as to be easily described 
by simple or even elaborate cross-sectional surveys. While they 
add significantly to the body of knowledge, such surveys are only 
stepping stones* The conclusions which flow from such measurements 
must be re-checked continually*
In short, the seminal studies which were conducted early in 
the development of our knowledge of voting behavior may be due 
for close scrutiny and re-examination in light of possible changes 
in the political climate and in the characteristics of the American 
electorate*
APPENDIX I
INTRODUCTORY LETTER TO MEMBERS OF THE 
HARRISONBURG SAMPLE
March 27, 1973
Dear Harrisonburg Voter,
I am a graduate student in the Department of Government at 
the College of William and Mary, currently working on a research 
project as part of the requirements for a Master*s degree* I live 
in Keezletown, and I’ve decided to concentrate my research in the 
Harrisonburg area* This study will involve a survey of political 
attitudes of voters in the city of Harrisonburg.
Your name is one of those which was selected at random to be 
a part of the survey. Within the next several weeks, an interviewer 
will call on you at home to ask you several questions* His or her 
questions will take only a few minutes, and I can assure you that 
your responses will be kept in confidence— your name will not be 
used*
This project is, of course, very important to me, and I 
thank you in advance for your cooperation*
Sincerely,
Haywood Blakemore
APPENDIX II
QUESTIONNAIRE EMPLOYED FOR THE HARRISONBURG 
POLITICAL ATTITUDES SURVEY
#___________
Precinct
Intervi ewer__________
(Read) This survey is part of an academic research project 
being conducted by a graduate student at the College of William and 
Mary. I'm going to ask you a number of questions about your 
political views, and I'd appreciate your cooperation. Your 
responses will be kept in confidence and your name will not be 
used.
1. How long have you lived in Harrisonburg?
less than five years five to ten years ten to twenty
years more than twenty years all m y  life
no response
2. For how many years have you been a registered voter?
less than five years five to ten years more than
ten years no response
3. What is your occupation? (Interviewer classify.)
blue collar white collar housewife
merchant clerical student unemployed
retired no response
(Indicate the respondent's sex. Do not ask.) 
male female
APPENDIX II—  CONTINUED
5. With respect to national politics, do you ususally think of your­
self as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?
republican democrat_____ independent no response
6. (If Republican or Democrat) Would you call yourself a strong 
(Republican or Democrat) or a not very strong (Republican or 
Democrat)?
(If Independent) Do you think of yourself as closer to the 
Republican or Democratic party?
strong republican  weak republican strong democrat
weak democrat  independent republican independent
democrat solid independent no response
7. through 30* (Give the respondent the issue sheet and a pencil.) 
Here is a list of some national issues. I’d like you to indicate 
in the proper column whether you favor an increase, a decrease 
or no change for each issue.
31. In talking to people'about last November’s election, we find 
that a lot of people weren’t able to vote because they weren’t 
registered, or they were sick or they just didn’t have the 
time. How about you, did you vote this time?
yes no no response
32. For whom did you vote in the November Presidential election?
McGovern Nixon Schmitz other didn’t vote
33. How about in 1968. Do you recall how you voted?
Humphrey Nixon Wallace other ______ didn’t vote
34. Now how about the 1964 election, when President Johnson and 
Senator Goldwater were running. How did you vote then?
LBJ Goldwater other didn’t vote
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35. And finally, in the 1960 race, with Kennedy and Nixon. Do you 
recall how you voted that time?
JFK Nixon other didn’t vote no response_____
36. (Hand respondent Card #1.) We’re interested in how far you went 
in school. Tell me what number on this card indicates the highest 
grade you completed.
grade 1-5 grade 6-8 grade 9-11 high school grad
1-2 years college 3-4 years college college grad
post-graduate work no response
37. (Hand respondent Card #2.) Which of the numbers on this card 
indicates the category of your household income, in your opinion?
lower lower middle middle upper middle
upper no response
38. (Hand respondent Card #3.) Which of the numbers on this card 
indicates the category which includes your present age?
18-25_____  26-35 36-45___   46-55_____  56-65___ _
over 65 no response
39. How do you react to the following statement: A local law which 
would allow restaurants in the city to serve mixed drinks of 
alcoholic beverages would be a good thing. Do you agree, strongly 
agree, disagree or strongly disagree?
strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree
no response
40. If a referendum were held to determine if restaurants in 
Harrisonburg would be allowed to serve mixed alcoholic drinks, 
how would you expect to vote, yes or no?
yes no probably would not vote no response
APPENDIX II—  CONTINUED 
ISSUE SHEET FOR QUESTIONNAIRE
Issue Increase Decrease No Change
1* Public Ownership of 
Natural Resources
2* Public Control of 
Atomic Energy
3* Level of Farm 
Price Supports
4. Government Regulation 
of Business
5* Enforcement of
Anti-Monopoly Laws
6* Regulation of 
Trade Unions
7. Level of Tariffs
8. Restrictions on Credit
9* Regulation of Public 
Utilities
10. Federal Aid to Education
11* Slum Clearance and 
Public Housing
12. Social Security Benefits
13* Minimum Wages
14. Enforcement of Integration
15. Immigration into the 
United States
16. Corporate Income Tax
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Issue Increase Decrease No Change
17. Tax on Large Incomes
18. Tax on Business
19. Tax on Middle Incomes
20. Tax on Small Incomes
21. Reliance on the United Nations
22. American Participation in 
Military Alliances
23. Foreign Aid
24. Defense Spending
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